Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cowles Foundation

11-2021

Organizational Structure and Pricing: Evidence from a Large U.S.
Airline
Ali Hortaçsu
Olivia R. Natan
Hayden Parsley
Timothy Schwieg
Kevin R. Williams
Yale University, kevin.williams@yale.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Hortaçsu, Ali; Natan, Olivia R.; Parsley, Hayden; Schwieg, Timothy; and Williams, Kevin R., "Organizational
Structure and Pricing: Evidence from a Large U.S. Airline" (2021). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
2683.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2683

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PRICING:
EVIDENCE FROM A LARGE U.S. AIRLINE
By

Ali Hortaçsu, Olivia R. Natan , Hayden Parsley, Timothy Schwieg and
Kevin R. Williams

November 2021
Revised March 2022
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2312R

COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.yale.edu/

Organizational Structure and Pricing:
Evidence from a Large U.S. Airline
Ali Hortaçsu, University of Chicago and NBER
Olivia R. Natan , University of California, Berkeley
Hayden Parsley, University of Texas, Austin
Timothy Schwieg, University of Chicago, Booth
Kevin R. Williams, Yale School of Management and NBER*
March 2022
Abstract
Although typically modeled as a centralized ﬁrm decision, pricing often involves
multiple organizational teams that have decision rights over speciﬁc pricing inputs.
We study team input decisions using comprehensive data from a large U.S. airline.
We document that pricing at a sophisticated ﬁrm is subject to miscoordination across
teams, uses persistently biased forecasts, and does not account for cross-price elasticities. With structural demand estimates derived from sales and search data, we ﬁnd
that addressing one team’s biases in isolation has little impact on market outcomes.
We show that teams do not optimally account for biases introduced by other teams.
We estimate that corrected and coordinated inputs would lead to a signiﬁcant reallocation of capacity. Leisure consumers would beneﬁt from lower fares, and business
customers would face signiﬁcantly higher fares. Dead-weight loss would increase in
the markets studied. Finally, we discuss likely mechanisms for the observed pricing
biases.
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Introduction

In economics, the pricing decision of the ﬁrm is typically modeled as the ﬁrm choosing
a single price (or quantity) to maximize a known objective. In reality, large ﬁrms are not
unitary decision makers. Rather, they are usually comprised of teams, each responsible
for a particular sub-decision. Prices are often set through complex optimization systems
designed around the organizational structure of the ﬁrm. One team might manage procurement and inventory, another team specializes in demand predictions, and an additional team
monitors competitive response. Each team delivers its speciﬁc input to the entity determining price. For example, major airlines pioneered the use of pricing optimization algorithms
and operationalized these systems by delegating the decision rights for each of multiple
pricing inputs to distinct teams. Other industries, notably hotels, cruises, car rentals, entertainment venues, and retail, have adopted features of the airline pricing model. Given the
prevalence and durability of this type of organizational structure, we may expect that economic forces lead to pricing outcomes that are “as if” each ﬁrm centrally chooses prices,
as commonly modeled in economics.
In this paper we study organizational team inputs and pricing decisions by leveraging
a data partnership with a large international air carrier based in the United States.1 The
granularity of the data allows us to understand how the decisions of individual teams affect
prices without needing to assume that prices are optimally set. We document that the pricing at a sophisticated ﬁrm—one that employs advanced optimization techniques and relies
heavily on automation—is subject to miscoordination and multiple biases. To quantify how
biases affect the allocation of scarce capacity, we estimate a model of airline demand using
sales and search information and contrast our predictions with the ﬁrm’s (biased) forecasts.
In counterfactuals, we show that if one team addresses its own “frictions” in isolation, outcomes are largely unchanged. Moreover, we show that teams do not optimally account for
biases introduced by other teams, that is, inputs are not second-best optimal for the ﬁrm.
Finally, we estimate a signiﬁcant reallocation of surplus would result if teams corrected bi1 The

airline has elected to remain anonymous.
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ases and coordinated on their pricing inputs. Leisure consumers would beneﬁt from lower
prices in advance, and business customers would face signiﬁcantly higher fares.
We begin by discussing airline pricing practices and the decision rights of the organizational teams involved in pricing in Section 2. The organization structure is vertical;
decisions are passed along to the next team as an input. The ﬁrst team (the network planning department) decides where to ﬂy and assigns initial capacities. We do not model these
decisions. The next team (the pricing department) takes the network as given and is responsible for choosing a menu of discrete possible prices consumers may face as well as ticket
restrictions, e.g., advance purchase discounts. A ﬁnal team (the revenue management department) is responsible for the demand forecast and for the choice of the pricing algorithm
which combines all inputs. The algorithm selected does not actually decide price, rather,
it allocates the amount of inventory to sell at each discrete price level. That is, “pricing”
involves both prices (as decided by the pricing department) and quantities (as decided by
the revenue management department). We discuss the information used by teams when
deciding their inputs. Using job listings, we show that all major airlines have similar organizational structures and team responsibilities. Therefore, we believe our discussion and
subsequent empirical ﬁndings likely hold for the airline industry broadly and perhaps for
other industries that have adopted similar pricing technologies and organizational structures.
We introduce the data in Section 3. In addition to observing prices and quantities, we
also observe granular demand forecasts, the demand model, outputs of the pricing and allocation algorithms, the optimization code itself, and clickstream data that detail all consumer
interactions on the airline’s website. The core data cover hundreds of thousands of ﬂights
spanning hundreds of domestic origin-destination pairs.
In Section 4, we provide evidence of pricing biases and miscoordination. Within teams,
we show that the revenue management (RM) department maintains persistently biased forecasts over two years of data. The RM department has also chosen a pricing algorithm that is
inherently biased. The selected algorithm does not consider cross-price elasticities, mean-
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ing ﬂights are priced independently. Across teams, we show teams’ input decisions lead to
pricing frictions, where changes in marginal (opportunity) costs do not lead to price adjustments. Although this naturally arises due to the use of coarse pricing, or “fare buckets”, in
the industry, the fact that opportunity costs sometimes adjust by hundreds of dollars without
triggering a price adjustment suggests a mismatch between the fares chosen by the pricing
department and demand fundamentals.
We present two forms of miscoordination. We show there is a “glitch” in that the pricing
algorithm sometimes allocates inventory to fares that do not exist. This occurs because the
pricing team has not informed the RM team that these fares have been removed from the
menu. This affects 11% of observations. More importantly, we show that the fare choices
of the pricing department are often “too low.” When the fare choices are combined with
the forecast, the RM department observes that some fares are assigned on the inelastic side
of the RM department’s demand estimates. Because of the way inventory is allocated by
the pricing algorithm, it is possible that suboptimally low fares receive positive allocations.
We ﬁnd that prices offered to consumers are on the inelastic side of the RM department’s
forecasts in one third of the data sample. We observe no instances in which the pricing
department removes these low fares from the system.
We document that pricing biases affect all routes, regardless of market structure, and
are even more pronounced in competitive markets (larger forecast bias and more frequent
“inelastic prices” based on the RM department’s forecasts of residual demand). Due to
the additional complexity of modeling competitive interaction, our subsequent analysis
concentrates on routes where our carrier is the only airline providing nonstop service.
In the second stage of our analysis, we examine the pricing inputs using a structural
approach. We estimate a model of consumer demand using a recently proposed demand
methodology (Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley, Schwieg, and Williams, 2021). In Section 5, we
consider a model in which “leisure” and “business” travelers arrive according to independent and time-varying Poisson distributions in discrete time. Consumers know their
preferences and solve discrete choice maximization problems. Each short-lived consumer
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chooses among the available ﬂight options or an outside option.
We estimate the model using consumer search and bookings data. Aggregate search
counts calculated from the clickstream data inform the overall arrival process, and we
identify the price coefﬁcient using instrumental variables (see Section 6). The estimates,
presented in Section 7, reveal meaningful variation in demand, with a general increase in
search for travel as the departure date approaches and substantial changes in the overall
price sensitivity of consumers over time.
We then estimate “ﬁrm beliefs” about demand by matching the RM department’s forecasts to our demand model in Section 8. This allows us to ﬂexibly recover the preference
parameters consistent with the RM department’s demand predictions. We ﬁnd that ﬁrm
beliefs do not sufﬁciently distinguish between business and leisure willingness to pay and
features too little change in the mix of arriving customers toward the departure date. Firm
beliefs understate the heterogeneity in preferences within and across routes.
In Section 9, we perform counterfactual analyses using a pricing algorithm that closely
follows the heuristic that the ﬁrm uses in practice. We show that if the RM department uses
an unbiased forecast, with fare menus unchanged, or, if the pricing department aligned
its pricing menus to the RM department’s biased forecasts, the pricing algorithm selects
very similar inventory allocations. Consequently, outcomes are largely unchanged. We
also consider outcomes as if the ﬁrm centrally chooses prices. With an unbiased forecast
and fare menus tailored to this forecast, we estimate that prices charged to early-arriving
leisure passengers would fall, and late-arriving business travelers would face higher prices.
We ﬁnd that revenue increases upward of 18% for some markets, and dead-weight loss may
rise by over 10%.
Our results establish that teams are not best responding to the (biased) inputs of other
teams—that is, outcomes are not near second-best optimal for the ﬁrm. We show that if
the upstream team, the pricing department, were given unbiased demand estimates, the department could alter its fare menu choices—holding the RM department inputs ﬁxed—and
achieve 95% of the gap to the ﬁrst-best outcome for the ﬁrm. In a second counterfactual,
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we show that holding the pricing department’s fare inputs ﬁxed, the RM department could
improve overall revenue to 33% of the gap to the ﬁrst-best outcome by manipulating its current demand forecasts. This requires substantially more biased forecasts to counteract that
the pricing algorithm commonly allocates capacity to suboptimally lower fares inputted by
the pricing department.
We close by discussing potential explanations for our ﬁndings. Although we cannot
establish a causal link for the biases we explore, we argue that performance metrics, including a focus on load factors, limited transfer of information across teams, and limited
experimentation are likely mechanisms. We rule out some explanations. For example, we
argue that teams are not intentionally distorting pricing inputs so that the pricing algorithm
considers long-run demand because of the algorithm choice, forecasting model, and forecast bias across types of tickets sold. Another hypothesis is that the ﬁrm manipulates inputs
due to long-term competitive reasons; however, we argue the presence of (even more pronounced) biases in competitive markets suggests managers are not attempting to deter entry
with limit pricing.

1.1 Related Literature
Our ﬁndings that prices are neither ﬁrst nor second-best optimal for a large U.S. ﬁrm support classic theories in organizational economics which posit that coordination on complementary tasks may be difﬁcult in practice (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995; Siggelkow,
2001). Although the adoption of information technology (IT) can increase productivity
when complementary organizational and management practices are implemented alongside
these investments (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen,
2012), ﬁrms may not adopt technologies that increase productivity or revenues (Atkin,
Chaudhry, Chaudry, Khandelwal, and Verhoogen, 2017; Sacarny, 2018).2 In our context, the airline has adopted advanced IT, however, pricing biases prevent the carrier from
achieving outcomes as if prices were centrally determined, absent frictions.
2 Brynjolfsson

and Milgrom (2012) provide an overview of this and related work.
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Our analysis of biases introduced within teams complements studies on miscalibrated
ﬁrm expectations (Massey and Thaler, 2013; Akepanidtaworn, Di Mascio, Imas, and Schmidt,
2019; Ma, Ropele, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2020), and our analysis of biases introduced across
teams allows us to explain deviations from optimal behavior shown in other settings (Blake,
Nosko, and Tadelis, 2015; Levitt, 2016; Dubé and Misra, 2021). Our emphasis on miscoordination of pricing inputs highlights the problem of “implementation” as described in
Gibbons and Henderson (2012). That is, prices are known to frequently be set on the inelastic side of (the RM department’s own estimates) of demand, removing these too low
fares is necessary to optimize on price, but managers have not implemented changes to
correct this bias. We compare current outcomes to the scenario devoid of pricing biases
but we note that this outcome may not be achievable if the cost of communication is high.
Dessein and Santos (2006) examine a related team-theoretic model theoretically.
The data allow us to directly measure pricing frictions, as observed marginal cost
changes may not lead to price adjustments. These price rigidities have been argued to occur
in other industries, including DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) and Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and
Lin (2021) in retailing, Huang (2021) in peer-to-peer markets, Ellison, Snyder, and Zhang
(2018) in online retailing.
Finally, we contribute to a large empirical literature on the airline industry, e.g., McAfee
and Te Velde (2006); Li, Granados, and Netessine (2014); Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins
(2015); Aryal, Murry, and Williams (2021); Williams (2021), without imposing that prices
are optimally set. We quantify the welfare effects of dynamic pricing in airline markets
using heuristics used in the industry (Littlewood, 1972; Belobaba, 1987, 1989; Brumelle,
McGill, Oum, Sawaki, and Tretheway, 1990; Belobaba, 1992; Wollmer, 1992).
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2

Organizational Structure and Division Responsibilities

We study the US airline industry, an industry that directly supports over two million jobs
and contributes over $700 billion to the US economy.3 In 2019 alone, 811 million passengers ﬂew within the United States.4 In addition to being an important industry in its own
right, airlines have inﬂuenced the development of pricing technologies that are now used in
other sectors—for example, in hospitality, retailing, and entertainment and sports events.
Although the sophistication of these technologies has improved, many of the original yield
management ideas described in McGill and Van Ryzin (1999) and Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2004) remain in place today.
Fares at our air carrier depend on the actions of managers in several distinct departments. The organizational structure is vertical as decisions become increasingly granular,
taking all previous departments’ decisions as given. These decentralized decisions involve
little coordination, as evidenced by their internal documentation, discussions with managers, and the data we describe below.
First, the network planning department decides the network, ﬂight frequencies, and
capacity choices. These decisions depend on operational constraints, trafﬁc patterns, slot
restrictions, and government approvals. We take the capacity constraints as given and do
not endogenize network planning decisions. Having observed the network, the pricing department then sets a discrete menu of fares and fare restrictions for all possible itineraries.5
Finally, the revenue management (RM) department maintains the demand forecast and optimizes remaining inventory over the fares set by the pricing department. The diagram
in Figure 1 depicts organizational boundaries involved with pricing decisions. In Online
Appendix A, we use job listings to show that all major airlines are organized in this way.
The pricing team has two core responsibilities. The ﬁrst is to facilitate the transmission
3 See https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/the-united-states–value-of-aviation/. July 1, 2021.
4 See https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/2019-trafﬁc-data-us-airlines-and-foreign-airlines-us-ﬂights-ﬁnal-full-year. July 1, 2021.
5 Each

ﬁled fare contains an origin, destination, ﬁling date, class of service, routing requirements, and
other ticket restrictions. A common fare restriction decided by the pricing department is an advance purchase
discount, which speciﬁes an expiration date for a discounted fare to be purchased by. These discounts are
commonly observed 7, 14, and 21 days before departure.
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Figure 1: Division Responsibilities at all Airlines
Network Planning
Routes Served
Frequencies
Capacities

Pricing
Fares
Fare Restrictions

RM
Demand Analysis /
Forecast
Pricing Algorithm

Note: Key departments, responsibilities, and decision-making process at all airlines.

of fares through distribution channels so that consumers can retrieve and purchase tickets
online. It is our understanding that this is a labor intensive process and involves real menu
costs, as carriers are charged a small fee for each fare adjustment. The second core responsibility (and objective) is to assess the airline’s current fare positions relative to market
conditions—including own connecting fares and competitor fares—and ﬁle fare updates.
These decisions are made without the use of demand forecasts. Instead, the pricing team
uses information on own historical fares and fares ﬁled by other airlines for similar markets.
The RM department is responsible for allocating remaining inventory over time. It has
decision rights over demand estimates, ﬂight forecasts, and the pricing algorithm. The
department does not have control over the fare and initial capacity decisions. The RM
department aims to maximize revenues and closely monitors ﬂight-level load factors and
revenue yield as performance statistics (see Section 9.4 for additional details).
The forecasting model used by RM predicts ﬂight-level bookings at granular intervals,
e.g., quantity demanded by day before departure and price. The pricing algorithm chosen
by the RM department is designed to maximize short-run, ﬂight-level revenues. We observe
exactly how the ﬁrm allocates remaining inventory (and hence, prices) over time. In our
empirical analysis, we select a pricing algorithm that closely approximates the actual optimization tool. The heuristic we select is Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR-b). We
provide additional details of the EMSR-b in Online Appendix B and outline the important
features of the algorithm here. EMSR-b simpliﬁes dynamic pricing problems with ﬁnite
capacity and a deadline by assuming that all future demand will arrive tomorrow. The key
trade-off, therefore, is to offer seats today versus reserve them for tomorrow. Given all of
8

the pricing inputs, it calculates the opportunity cost of a seat and then assigns the number of
seats it is willing to sell at each price level. Lowest priced units are assumed to sell ﬁrst. If
expected future demand is high, it will restrict inventory at lower prices today. This raises
the distribution of fares offered. When capacity is relatively unconstrained, the algorithm
will allocate more capacity to lower fares.

Fare Bucket

Figure 2: Fare Bucket Availability and Lowest Available Fare

Bucket12
Bucket11
Bucket10
Bucket9
Bucket8
Bucket7
Bucket6
Bucket5
Bucket4
Bucket3
Bucket2
Bucket1
120

Lowest Available Price

100

80

60
40
Days Before Departure

20

0

Note: Image plot of fare availability over time as well as the active lowest available fare. Bucket1 is the least expensive bucket; Bucket12
is the most expensive bucket. The color depicts the magnitude of prices—blue are lower fares, red are more expensive. White space
denotes no fare availability. The white line depicts the lowest available fare.

To emphasize how the inputs come together in pricing, we show fare menu choices
and the resulting pricing decision for an example ﬂight in Figure 2. On the vertical axis,
we note the discrete set of fares set by the pricing department, with bucket one being the
least expensive and bucket twelve being the most expensive. Little variation in color over
days from departure for a given bucket shows that the bucket prices themselves are mostly
ﬁxed. However, in the bottom right of the graph, the white space shows that the pricing
department has restricted the availability of the lowest fares close to the departure date.
Given all pricing inputs, the white line marks the lowest available price (LAP), or the
lowest price with allocated inventory, by the pricing algorithm.
The pricing algorithm is inﬂuenced by all pricing inputs (initial capacity, prices, and the
forecast) and it need not provide a good approximation to solving the dynamic program.
For example, one could imagine removing the pricing department by simply inputting fares
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in dollar increments, e.g., $150, $151, and so on. Because of the way the algorithm determines inventory allocations, granular fares can actually introduce distortions and yield
worse outcomes relative to the use of coarse pricing. We show that fare menus greatly
affect the pricing algorithm performance in Section 4 and Section 9.
The algorithm code and accompanying documentation detail what is included and excluded from optimization. All ﬂights, regardless of market structure, ﬂight frequencies,
etc., are priced using the same algorithm. All forms of auxiliary revenue, including baggage fees and upgrade charges, are not considered when prices are determined.

3

Data and Summary Analysis

We use data provided by a large international air carrier based in the United States. To
maintain anonymity, we exclude some data details. We do not study all routes served by the
airline due to data size constraints; instead, we select over 400 routes. In Online Appendix
C, we discuss route selection. On average, the routes we study have a higher fraction of
nonstop trafﬁc, fewer ﬂights per day, and smaller total capacity compared to the air carrier’s
overall network. Nonetheless, our descriptive analyses cover a diverse set of routes in terms
of competition, seasonality, frequencies, and trafﬁc ﬂows. The sample contains large “trunk
routes” between major cities as well as routes from major metropolitan areas to small cities.
We focus solely on domestic ﬂights.

3.1 Data Tables
We combine several data sources, which we refer to as: (1) bookings, (2) inventory, (3)
search, (4) fares, and (5) forecasting data.
(1) Bookings data: The bookings data contain details for each purchased ticket, regardless of booking channel, e.g., the airline’s website, travel agency, etc. Key variables
included in these data are the fare paid, the number of passengers involved, the particular
ﬂights included in the itinerary, the booking channel, and the purchase date. Our analysis
10

concentrates on nonstop, economy class tickets.
(2) Inventory data: The inventory data contain the decisions made by the pricing algorithm. Inventory allocation is conducted daily. The data include the number of seats the
airline is willing to sell for each fare class in economy and remaining capacity. We also
observe output from the pricing algorithm, including the opportunity cost of a seat.
(3) Search data: We observe all consumer interactions on the airline’s website for
two years. The clickstream data include any interactions or impressions that a consumer
has on the website including, but not limited to, search queries, bookings, referrals from
other websites, and the sets of ﬂights that appear on every page the consumer visits. We
link consumers across search sessions using a combination of web cookie(s) and login
information tracked by the air carrier.
(4) Filed fares data: The ﬁled fares data contain the decisions made by the airline’s
pricing department. A ﬁled fare contains the price, fare class, and all ticket restrictions,
including any advance purchase discount requirements.
(5) Forecasting data: The RM department forecasts current and future demand at granular levels. The current-period forecast correspond to an economist’s deﬁnition of demand,
i.e., quantity demanded for various prices, and future demand forecasts predict future bookings for given a particular forecasting period, i.e., quantity demand t days before departure
as predicted s > t days before departure. The ﬁrm maintains separate forecasts for “business” and “leisure” travelers. An algorithm classiﬁes all search and bookings to these
classiﬁcations. We also observe all managerial adjustments to the forecasts.

3.2

Data Summary

Table 1 provides a basic summary of the nearly 300,000 ﬂights / 400 routes in our cleaned
sample. We focus on the last 120 days before departure due to the overwhelming sparsity
of search and sales observations earlier in the booking horizon.
Average ﬂight fares in our sample are $201, with large dispersion across routes and over
time. Typically, prices for a particular ﬂight adjust nine times and double in 120 days. Many
11

Table 1: Summary Statistics
Data Series

Variable

Mean Std. Dev. Median

5th pctile

95th pctile

One-Way Fare ($)
Num. Fare Changes
Fare Change | Inc.
Fare Change | Dec.

201.3
9.3
50.4
-53.0

139.4
4.2
73.0
75.5

163.3
9.0
31.2
-32.2

88.0
3.0
2.2
-175.2

411.1
17.0
164.5
-4.3

0.2
0.6
82.2

0.7
1.4
21.4

0.0
0.0
90.0

0.0
0.0
36.0

1.0
3.0
102.0

1.9

4.8

0.0

0.0

9.0

Fares

Bookings
Booking Rate-OD
Booking Rate-All
Load Factor (%)
Searches
Search Rate

Summary statistics for the data sample. Fares are for nonstop ﬂights only. The booking rates are for non-award, direct travel on nonstop
ﬂights and for all trafﬁc on nonstop ﬂights, respectively. The number of passengers denotes the number of passengers per booking. The
ending load factor includes all bookings, including award and connecting itineraries. The search rate is for origin-destination queries at
the daily level.

price adjustments occur at speciﬁed times, such as after expiration of advance purchase
(AP) discount opportunities. However, over 60% of price adjustments occur before the
ﬁrst set of AP fares expires.
In our sample, the average load factor is 82.2%. Although overselling is possible, we
abstract from this possibility because we do not observe denied boarding/no show information. Our notion of capacity will be actual plane capacity plus the number of seats the
airline is willing to sell over capacity (if any)—the observed “authorized” capacity.

3.3 Empirical Facts that Motivate Demand Assumptions
We summarize search and purchase patterns to motivate some of our demand assumptions.
The bookings data suggest that unit demand is a reasonable assumption. The average
passengers per booking is 1.3. In addition, the bookings data conﬁrm that overwhelmingly,
consumers purchase the lowest available fare even though several fares may be offered at
any point in time. We ﬁnd that 91% of consumers purchase the lowest available fare. We
verify that special fares, such as corporate or government discounts, are very rare in the
routes studied. These fares are much more common in international markets.
12

Bookings and searches are sparse, which motivates using a model that accounts for low
daily demand. We ﬁnd that 60-80% of observations have zero observed searches. The
fraction of zero sales is even higher (80% zeros). Zeros are not just present because we
focus on nonstop demand. The fraction of zero sales for any itinerary involving a particular
ﬂight ranges between 40 and 80%.
We adopt a two-type consumer model, corresponding to “leisure” and “business” travelers, because that is how the ﬁrm forecasts demand.
Figure 3: Search and Booking Facts to Motivate Demand Model
1.0

1.0

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4
0.0

0.4
0.2

0.2
0

2
4
6
8
10
Number Re-Searching Same Itnerary

0.0

(c) Channel Booking Distributions
Percentage of Bookings

(b) CDF of Similar Itin. Searches

CDF

CDF

(a) CDF of Same Itin. Searches

0

2
4
6
8
10
Number DDs Searched for a Given OD

4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0

Direct
OTAs
Agency

120 100

80 60 40 20
Days From Departure

(a) Empirical CDF of the number of days from departure searchers appear for a given itinerary. (b) Empirical CDF of the number of
departure dates a given searcher looks for. (c) Percentage of bookings, across days from departure, for each channel. Direct refers to
bookings that occur on the air carrier’s website, OTAs are bookings made on online travel agencies, and Agency are bookings made
through travel agencies.

We use the clickstream data to explore consumer search patterns. We “daisychain” the
data, meaning we link searches across devices and cookies whenever possible. We investigate the tendency for consumers to return to search for tickets, conditional on not being
referred to the airline from other websites. In Figure 3-(a), we plot the CDF of number of
times that consumers search for the same itinerary across days. 90% of consumers search
for an itinerary (OD-DD pair) once. Panel (b) shows the CDF for the number of different
departure dates (for the same OD) that consumers search over. 82% of customers search a
single departure date. The average time lag between searches for different departure dates
is 45 days, which likely suggests different purchasing opportunities (different trips).
Figure 3-(c) shows the the distribution of bookings within channel (direct, OTAs, and
agency) over days before departure. The distribution of bookings for tickets purchased on
OTAs, or online travel agencies, very closely follows the distribution of bookings via the di13
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rect channel. However, they do not coincide. The agency curve—which includes corporate
travel bookings—is more concentrated closer to departure. This motivates adjusting for
unobserved searches differently over time (see Section 6.1). Note that Figure 3-(c) shows
some bunching in bookings immediately before advance purchase opportunities expire. Although this may suggest consumers strategically time their purchasing decisions—they are
forward looking—we ﬁnd evidence that supports certain time periods simply have higher
demands. Using the search data, we split the sample into two groups, one that includes
routes that never have 7-day AP requirements, and one that includes these requirements.
We ﬁnd that search activity (and purchases) bunch at the 7-day AP requirement, regardless
of their existence. Because arrivals increase regardless of price changes, we maintain the
commonly used assumption that the market size is not endogenous to price. To account
for this bunching in our model, we ﬂexibly estimate arrivals as a function of days from
departure and the departure date.

4

Pricing Biases

In this section, we provide evidence of pricing biases and miscoordination among teams
managing pricing inputs.

4.1 Pricing Biases within Organizational Teams
Using Persistently Biased Forecasts
We begin by discussing pricing biases introduced by a single team.
The demand forecasts maintained by the RM department are persistently biased in two
years of data. In Figure 4, we plot the RM department’s forecasts of demand remaining
along with realized future sales remaining. The lines decrease over time because fewer
sales remain. On average, the forecasts are biased upwards from the true distribution of
bookings for nearly the entire booking horizon. For the median observed forecast, the
forecast is 10% higher than actual future demand, which is equivalent to predicting an extra
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2.5 seats will be sold. Although the average forecast is biased upward, suggesting prices
may be too high, the forecasts are also misaligned with observed demand at different prices
(panel b). Low-fare transactions are underforecasted by 20%, and high-fare transactions are
overforecasted by 10%.6 This suggests the forecasting model does not accurately reﬂect
underlying demand.
Figure 4: Firm Forecasting and Realized Sales
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Note: Forecasts and future sales are normalized by the aircraft’s total coach capacity. Plots show 7-day moving average to smooth across
strong day of week effects in the forecast sample. (a) Raw and managerial adjusted forecast of future demand compared to realized sales.
(b) Average forecast bias for observations at differing fare levels.

We also observe all managerial adjustments to the forecasts, which are also plotted
in Figure 4-(a). We ﬁnd that manager adjustments reduced overall forecast bias, but the
improvement is small in magnitude relative to the total absolute bias. Manager adjustments
tend to deﬂate the forecasts for all ﬂights for a given route (or routes) rather than react
to individual ﬂight realizations. These adjustments do not reduce forecast bias across the
types of tickets (prices) sold.
Forecasts are biased for all routes in the sample, and we do not ﬁnd evidence that
the ﬁrm is allocating more resources to reduce forecast bias in higher revenue generating
routes. To the contrary, we ﬁnd that routes with nonstop competitors feature slightly larger
forecasting bias compared to single carrier routes. The frequency of managerial adjustments is similar across routes.
6 Low

fares refer to the bottom 3 fare classes; high fares refer to the top 3 classes.
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Not Accounting for Cross-Price Elasticities
Reviewing the algorithm code, we conﬁrm that the RM department has selected a pricing
heuristic that does not internalize substitution to own products—for example, across cabins
or to other ﬂights—as well as substitution to other products, including all competitor ﬂights.
Therefore, another bias introduced within a team is that the RM department has selected
a biased pricing algorithm that abstracts from cross-price elasticities. We use output from
the pricing algorithm to demonstrate how this bias affects pricing decisions.
Figure 5: Shadow Value and Price Response to Bookings with Multiple Flights
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Note: (a) The orange line denotes the average change in shadow value for a ﬂight with bookings. The blue line is the average change to
shadow value when a sale occurs for the substitute product. (b) This panel depicts the same as panel a, but instead of changes in shadow
value it depicts changes in price.

We select observations that satisfy the following conditions: (i) the ﬁrm offers two
ﬂights a day; (ii) we include periods where demand is not being reforecasted (the observed
spikes in Figure 6); (iii) the total daily booking rate is low (less than 0.5); and (iv) one
ﬂight receives bookings and the other ﬂight does not. By considering markets where the
total booking rate is low, we can apply theoretical results of continuous time (as well as a
discrete time approximation) pricing models. In Figure 5-(a), we plot the average change
in shadow values (opportunity costs) for the ﬂights that receive bookings and for the ﬂights
that do not receive bookings (the substitute option) using ﬂexible regressions. In standard
dynamic pricing models, every time a unit of capacity is sold, prices jump. This is also true
in environments with multiple products—any sale causes all prices to increase. Figure 5-(a)
conﬁrms substitute shadow values are unaffected by bookings. Panel (b) shows that there
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is no price response.7

4.2 Pricing Biases across Organizational Teams
Pricing Frictions
Figure 6 demonstrates a pricing bias introduced across organizational teams. In panel (a),
we plot the fraction of ﬂights that experience changes in price or shadow value (as reported
by the pricing algorithm) over time. The ﬁgure establishes that airline pricing is subject
to pricing frictions in that costs change at a much higher frequency than do prices. This
occurs because the pricing department assigns a discrete set of potential fares (fare buckets)
for each route. This naturally creates a pricing friction because marginal costs may change
by $1 but the next fare may be $20 more expensive. Our analysis suggests this friction
is signiﬁcantly more important. In panel (b), we run a ﬂexible regression of the change in
costs on an indicator function of a price adjustment occurring. As the ﬁgure shows, changes
in marginal costs exceeding $100 only lead to price adjustments with 20% probability.
This suggests a mismatch between the fares set by the pricing department and underlying
demand fundamentals for the routes in our sample.
Figure 6: Fare Adjustments in Response to Shadow Value Changes
(a) Fare vs. Shadow Price Changes
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Note: (a) The fraction of ﬂights that experience changes in the fare or the shadow value of capacity over time. (b) The probability of a
fare change, conditional on the magnitude of the shadow value change.
7 We

quantify the impacts of this bias in Online Appendix E.
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Figure 6-(a) shows noticeable spikes that occur at seven day intervals. This arises because the RM department has chosen to reforecast demand on a 7-day interval. Outside of
these periods, remaining inventory is reoptimized without updating future demand expectations.8 The process of reforcasting demand leads to a larger fraction of ﬂights experiencing
a change in the value of remaining capacity.

4.3 Miscoordination in Pricing Inputs
Allocating Inventory to Fares that do not Exist
One form of miscoordination present in the ﬁrm’s pricing decisions is that the pricing
department does not necessarily ensure that the RMdepartment has the correct set of active
fares inputted into the pricing algorithm. Although this form of miscoordination can be
seen as a “glitch," its presence and prevalence suggests barriers in sharing information
across teams.
Examining the menu of active fares (set by the pricing department) and the resulting
inventory allocations (managed by the RM team), we observe inventory allocations to fares
that do not exist. This affects 11.7% of observations. The most consequential form of this
type of miscoordination is when the pricing algorithm allocates inventory to a fare lower
than what is actually possible. For example, suppose there are two fares, at $50 and $100.
The pricing algorithm may allocate seats to the $50 fare, but if that fare does not actually
exist, the realized price will be $100. Consequently, the realized fare will be higher than
what the pricing algorithm expects.9 We ﬁnd that 71.2% of these “phantom allocations”
occur to fares that are lower than the realized lowest available fare.
Smaller routes and routes with seasonal service are most affected by phantom allocations. 32.6% of routes feature persistent phantom allocations to at least one fare class
throughout the entire data sample. We observe no actions that address this form of misco8 We

explore the idea of reforecasting/learning in Online Appendix E.
the pricing system never observes this allocation error because fare validation occurs after
inventory allocation.
9 Moreover,
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ordination.
Pricing on the Inelastic Side of the Demand Curve
A second form of miscoordination that we observe in the data is that the pricing department
often ﬁles fares that are too low according to the RM department’s forecast. Although
having some fares (within the menu) on the inelastic side of demand may seem innocuous,
the chosen pricing algorithm cannot prevent allocating inventory to “too low” fares. This
leads to mispricing—known to the RM department—yet we observe no instances where
this miscoordination is corrected.
We provide a simple example to illustrate mispricing before presenting our evidence.
Example: Suppose the airline has 15 seats to sell over two days. Demand in the ﬁrst
period is equal to Q1 (p1 ) = 10 − 10p1 , and demand in the second period is Q2 (p2 ) = 10 − p2 .
If the ﬁrm maximized revenues, using standard methods, we see that the capacity constraint
would not bind, and optimal prices are equal to (p1 , p2 ) = (0.5, 5).
This outcome can also be achieved with separate pricing and RM departments and a
pricing algorithm: The pricing department assigns prices to be {0.5, 5} and {5}, and the
RM department “forecasts” demand to be the functions above. Importantly, commonly
used inventory management algorithms, including EMSR-b, only restrict inventory today
(ﬁrst period) to ensure that future demand can be satisﬁed tomorrow (second period). Because only 5 seats are needed tomorrow, it will allocate all seats to the price of 0.5 today.
Tomorrow, the price will be 5—which can be viewed as an advance-purchase discount..
Instead, suppose the pricing department does not coordinate with the RM group and set
prices equal to {.2, .5, 5} and {5}. Because all ﬁrst-period prices leave sufﬁcient capacity
available for the second period, EMSR-b will allocate all seats at the lowest price in the
ﬁrst period, which is now 0.2. This implies that the suboptimal price of 0.2 will be chosen
even though the optimal price, 0.5, is included in the fare menu.
This simple example demonstrates a feature of the data that we observe often. Using the
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RM department’s current-period demand forecasts, we calculate the elasticity of demand,
[(Q1 −Q2 )/Q2 ]/[(P1 − P2 )/P2 ], using the observed price as the base price along with the next

higher fare.10 We ﬁnd that 34% of ﬂight observations are priced on the inelastic side of the
demand forecasts estimated by the RM department. This is an example of the problem of
implementation (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012), as the problem is identiﬁed, the solution
is known, yet managers have not corrected this form of miscoordination.
We observe the (hashed) identities of the revenue management and pricing analysts
involved in managing pricing inputs for each market, which allows us to explore if this
form of miscoordination is limited to certain markets and/or analyst teams. We estimate
regressions of the form I(elasticity > −1)r,i = X r,i β +u r,i , where X contains team identiﬁers
as well as route characteristics. Although we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant differences across
analyst teams, even the best teams are associated with setting “inelastic prices” 30% of
the time. Higher trafﬁc routes tend to have a larger percentage of inelastic prices. We
conclude that miscoordination is widespread and not isolated to particular analyst teams
and/or routes.

5

Empirical Model of Air Travel Demand

In order to quantify the welfare effects of pricing biases, we need to estimate a model of
air travel demand. We utilize both the demand model and estimation approach of Hortaçsu,
Natan, Parsley, Schwieg, and Williams (2021). We consider the demand for nonstop ﬂights.
The deﬁnition of a market is an origin-destination (r ), departure date (d ), and day before
departure (t ) tuple. The booking horizon for each ﬂight j leaving on date d is t ∈ {0, ..., T }.
The ﬁrst period of sale is t = 0, and the ﬂight departs at T . In each of the sequential
markets t , arriving consumers choose ﬂights from the choice set J (r, t , d ) that maximize
their individual utilities, or select the outside option, j = 0.
also compute the arc elasticity, [(Q1 −Q2 )/(Q1 +Q2 )/2]/[(P1 −P2 )/(P1 +P2 )/2]. Using the arc elasticity,
we ﬁnd 52% of observations are priced on the inelastic side of the demand curve.
10 We
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5.1 Utility Speciﬁcation
Arriving consumers are one of two types, corresponding to leisure (L ) travelers and business (B ) travelers. An individual consumer is denoted as i and her consumer type is denoted
by ℓ ∈ {B , L }. The probability that an arriving consumer is a business traveler is equal to γt .
We incorporate two assumptions to greatly simplify the demand system. First, we assume
that consumers are not forward looking and do not strategically choose ﬂights based on
remaining capacity, C j ,t ,d . This avoids the complication that consumers may choose a less
preferred option in order to increase the chances of securing a seat. Second, we assume that
when demand exceeds remaining capacity for a particular ﬂight, random rationing ensures
the capacity constraint is not violated.
We assume that the indirect utilities are linear in product characteristics and given by
(suppressing the r subscript; all parameters are route speciﬁc)

u i , j ,t ,d =


 X
j ,t ,d β − p j ,t ,d αℓ(i ) + ξ j ,t ,d + ϵi , j ,t ,d ,

j ∈ J (t , d )

 ϵi ,0,t ,d ,

j =0

,

where X j ,t ,d denote product characteristics other than price p j ,t ,d . Consumer preferences
over product characteristics and price are denoted by β , αℓ



ℓ∈{B ,L }

. For notational par-

simony, we commonly refer to the collection {αB , αL } as α. The term ξ j ,t ,d denotes an
unobservable that is potentially correlated with price, and ϵi , j ,t ,d is an unobserved random component of utility and is assumed to be distributed according to a type-1 extreme
value distribution. All consumers solve a straightforward utility maximization problem;
consumer i chooses ﬂight j if, and only if,
u i , j ,t ,d ≥ u i , j 0 ,d ,t , ∀ j 0 ∈ J ∪ {0}.

The distributional assumption on the idiosyncratic error term leads to analytical expressions for the individual choice probabilities of consumers (Berry, Carnall, and Spiller,
2006). In particular, the probability that consumer i wants to purchase a ticket on ﬂight j
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is equal to
s ji,t ,d



exp X j ,t ,d β − p j ,t ,d αℓ(i ) + ξ j ,t ,d

.
=
P
1 + k ∈J (t ,d ) exp X k ,t ,d β − pk ,t ,d αℓ(i ) + ξk ,t ,d

Since consumers are one of two types, we deﬁne s jL,t ,d be the conditional choice probability
for a leisure consumer (and s jB,t ,d for a business consumer). Integrating over consumer
types, we have
s j ,t ,d = γt s jB,t ,d + (1 − γt )s jL,t ,d .

5.2 Arrival Processes and Integer-Valued Demand
We assume both consumer types arrive according to time-varying Poisson distributions. By
explicitly modeling consumer arrivals, we can rationalize low or even zero sale observations. Speciﬁcally, we assume: (i) arrivals are distributed Poisson with rate λt ,d , (ii) arrivals
are independent of price (as argued in Section 3.3); (iii) consumers have no knowledge of
remaining capacity; (iv) consumers solve the above utility maximization problems. With
these assumptions, conditional on prices and product characteristics, demand for ﬂight j is
equal to



q̃ j ,t ,d ∼ Poisson λt ,d · s j ,t ,d .
¦

©

With the random rationing assumption, demand may be censored, i.e., q j ,t ,d = min q̃ j ,t ,d , C j ,t ,d .

6 Estimation
6.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
Because consumer arrivals are observed at the t , d level, we cannot estimate the arrival
process at the same granularity. Instead, we estimate the arrival process assuming a multiplicative relationship between day before departure and departure dates using the following
speciﬁcation,
λt ,d = exp(λt + λd ).
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We pursue this parameterization because searches tend to increase over time (λt ) but there
are also strong departure-date effects (λd ). These parameters are route-speciﬁc.
In an ideal world, we observe all searches and estimate arrival rates using the sum of all
leisure and business searches, i.e., A Lt,d + A Bt,d . However, we do not observe all searches—
for example, a consumer that searches and purchases through a travel agency will result in
an observed purchase without an observed search. Figure 3-(a) motivates adjusting for unobserved searches differently over time. We use the distributions of bookings and searches
by passenger type as determined by the passenger-type classiﬁer. Using properties of the
Poisson distribution, we assign
A Lt,d ∼ Poisson(λt ,d (1 − γ̃t )/ζLt ),
A Bt,d ∼ Poisson(λt ,d γ̃t /ζBt ),

where γ̃t is the ﬁrm’s beliefs over the probability of business (see Section 8 for more details), and ζℓt is the fraction of bookings that do not occur on the direct channel for each
consumer type.11 That is, we use the relative fraction of L (B ) sales and searches across
channels to scale up L (B ) arrivals. This logic follows the simpler case with a single consumer type: if searches account for 20% of total bookings, and we assume unobserved
searches follow the same underlying demand distributions, we can scale up estimated arrival rates by 5×. As we are concerned about the accuracy of this assignment algorithm,
we conduct robustness to this speciﬁcation in Online Appendix D.2.12
We assume consumer utility is given by
u i , j ,t ,d = β0 − αℓ(i ) p j ,t ,d + FE(Time of Day j ) + FE(Week) + FE(DoW) + ξ j ,t ,d + ϵi , j ,t ,d ,

where "FE" denotes ﬁxed effects for the variable in parentheses. The ﬂexibility in the utility
11 We

use time intervals early on because of sparsity in searches and sales. The largest time window
is composed of 14 days. Closer to the departure date, the intervals become length one. We smooth the
calculated fractions using a ﬁfth order polynomial approximation.
12 An earlier version of this paper did not use the classiﬁer and simply scaled up arrivals by the percentage
of non-direct bookings. We obtained quantitatively similar demand estimates.
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and arrival process speciﬁcations allows for rich substitution patterns, including seasonality
effects, day-of-week effects, etc.
We parameterize the probability an arrival is of the business type as


exp f (t )

,
γt =
1 + exp f (t )

where f (t ) is an orthogonal polynomial basis of degree ﬁve with respect to days from departure. This speciﬁcation allows for non-monotonicites while producing values bounded
between zero and one.13

6.2 Estimation Procedure
We use a hybrid-Gibbs sampler to estimate route-speciﬁc parameters. With Poisson arrivals, we can rationalize zero-sale observations while maintaining a Bayesian IV correlation structure between price and ξ. Our approach builds upon the estimation procedure
developed by Jiang, Manchanda, and Rossi (2009) by incorporating search, Poisson demand, and censored demand. Additional details on the estimation procedure can be found
in Online Appendix D.1. A complete treatment can be found in Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley,
Schwieg, and Williams (2021).

6.3 Identiﬁcation and Instruments
One difﬁculty in estimating a model with aggregate demand uncertainty is separably identifying shocks to arrivals from shocks to preferences. We address this complication by
using search data. Conditional on market size, preference parameters are identiﬁed using
allow for the distribution of the random effects in demand, ξ and the residual of the pricing equation
υ (see Online Appendix for details), to vary by days before departure. We partition the distributions of shocks
into four blocks of time. Within each block, each ﬂight at the j , t , d level receives a demand shock drawn
13 We

from a joint normal distribution, with the distributions themselves varying across blocks. This ﬂexibility in
the distribution of demand shocks allows us to capture observed varying managerial intervention in pricing
over time. If we estimate the model with demand shocks exogenous to price, we estimate demand to be
slightly more inelastic compared to this speciﬁcation that allows for price endogeneity.
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the same variation commonly cited in the literature on estimating demand for differentiated
products using market-level data. The ﬂight-level characteristic parameters are identiﬁed
from the variation of ﬂights offered across markets, and the price coefﬁcients are identiﬁed
from exogenous variation introduced by instruments.
We use the carrier’s shadow price of capacity as reported by the pricing algorithm,
advance purchase indicators, and total number of inbound or outbound bookings from a
route’s hub airport as our demand instruments.14 Online Appendix D outlines the BayesianIV procedure. The advance purchase indicators account for the fact that prices typically
adjust in situations where the opportunity cost is not observed to change (see Figure 6).
The total number of inbound or outbound bookings to a route’s hub airport captures the
change in opportunity cost for ﬂights that are driven by demand shocks in other markets.
For example, for a ﬂight from A to B , where B potentially provides service elsewhere and
is a hub, we use all trafﬁc from B onward to other destinations C or D . We assume demand
shocks are independent across markets, so shocks to B → C and B → D are unrelated to
demand for A → B . Thus, a positive shock to onward trafﬁc, out of hub B , will raise the
opportunity cost of serving A → B → C or A → B → D . This propagates to price set on the
A → B leg. Note that these instruments are relevant even if the teams that set prices are not

optimally responding to information and each others’ actions. We are assuming only that
prices tend to react to marginal cost and exogenous capacity changes.

7 Demand Estimates
We select a subset of routes for estimation (39 ODs) where our air carrier is the only airline
providing nonstop service. Our estimation sample includes routes with varying market
characteristics, including ﬂight frequency, importance of seasonality, and percentage of
14 For

a route with origin O and destination D , where DPis a hub, the total number of outbound bookings
K
from the route’s hub airport is deﬁned as the following; i =1 QD ,D 0 . Where QD ,D 0 is the the total number
of bookings in period t , across all ﬂights, for all K routes where the origin is the original route’s destination.
PK If the route’s origin is the hub, we calculate the total number of inward bound bookings, which equals
i =1 Q O 0 ,O . Where Q O 0 ,O is the total bookings from all K routes where the original routes origin is the
destination.
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nonstop and non-connecting trafﬁc. Online Appendix C discusses the estimation sample in
more detail.
Figure 7: Model Estimates for Example Route
(a) Model vs. Data Search
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(d) Demand Elasticities over Time
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Note: The horizontal axis of all plots denotes the negative time index, e.g. zero corresponds to the last day before departure. (a)
Normalized model ﬁt of searches with data searches. (b) Model ﬁt of product shares with empirical shares. (c) Fitted values of γt over
time, along with the probability a consumer is business conditional on purchase. (d) Mean product elasticities over time.

We ﬁrst present results for an example route that demonstrates demand patterns we then
conﬁrm hold more broadly. For our example route, 88% of observations have zero product
sales. It is not unusual to have so many zeros. The number of nonstop ﬂights varies
over the calendar year; typically, one or two ﬂights are offered. In Figure 7-(a), we show
that our arrival rates closely match the scaled up arrival data. Note that arrival rates are
increasing toward the deadline. Panel (b) shows model and data booking rates over time.
Model bookings closely follow the data and show a common pattern that purchases tend to
increase as prices rise. This suggests demand becomes more inelastic, which we conﬁrm
in the bottom panels. Panel (c) reports our estimates of the probability of a business-type
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consumer. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant change in the composition of arriving consumers over time.
This pattern is consistent with the airline demand estimates in Williams (2021). Recall that
consumer types describe preferences, but not necessarily the reason for travel. In panel (d),
we plot average own-ﬂight price elasticities. Demand elasticities start at -2.1 and increase
past -1.0 closer to the departure date.
Table 2: Demand Estimates Summary across Markets
Parameter

Mean

Std. Dev.

Median

25th Pctile.

75th Pctile.

Monday Arrivals
Tuesday Arrivals
Wednesday Arrivals
Thursday Arrivals
Friday Arrivals
Saturday Arrivals
Sunday Arrivals

3.653
3.001
3.274
3.785
4.395
3.085
4.286

2.882
2.260
2.433
2.760
3.432
2.412
3.393

2.645
2.030
2.075
2.650
2.995
2.175
3.426

1.484
1.352
1.472
1.685
2.007
1.285
1.764

5.432
4.827
5.127
5.685
6.119
4.490
6.466

Day of Week Spread
Flight Time Spread
Week Spread

32.53
74.99
52.35

19.61
59.29
61.90

28.19
45.45
35.12

17.55
34.70
21.98

39.81
95.95
56.62

Intercept

-1.095
0.286
1.764

1.274
0.167
0.736

-0.777
0.277
1.834

-1.405
0.165
1.169

-0.509
0.376
2.199

αB
αL

Note: Spread refers to the dollar amount a leisure consumer would pay to move from the least preferred time or day offered to the most
preferred time or day of week. Arrival parameters refer to the variation in search across ﬂight departure day of the week.

In Table 2, we report variation in demand estimates across routes. The top panel shows
average arrival rates for different days of the week. The interquaratile ranges across routes
conﬁrm that average arrivals tend to be low. Friday and Sunday tend to be the busiest
travel days for the routes in our estimation sample. The next panel describes the spread
in willingness to pay (in dollars) for a leisure consumer to switch between the most and
least-preferred option (day of the week, time of the day, week of the year). Time of day
preferences tend to be stronger than day of week preferences. Consumers generally prefer
morning and late afternoon departure times. We estimate that some weeks have systematically higher demands than other weeks. This is not true for all routes, and it does not
always reﬂect seasonal variation in demand.
27

In Figure 8-(a), we plot arrival rates for the mean route as well as the interquartile
range over routes. Although levels of arrivals vary—the interquartile range spans more
than a doubling of arrivals—overall, search increases as the departure date approaches.
In addition, demand tends to become signiﬁcantly more inelastic over time, even though
prices tend to rise. This is shown in panel (b), which shows average own-price elasticities
for the mean, median, and interquartile range over routes. The drop off in elasticities close
to the departure date mostly reﬂect very signiﬁcant price increases after crossing advance
purchase discount opportunities.
Figure 8: Aggregate Arrivals and Elasticities
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(a) Estimated arrival rates aggregated over all 39 routes. (b) Estimated Own Price Elasticity of demand aggregated over all 39 routes.

Within our estimation sample, we estimate a mean elasticity of -1.05. We ﬁnd that 56%
of routes have inelastic demand at some point before departure. 82% of routes feature at
least 10% of markets (departure date, days before departure) with inelastic demand. Just
above half of the routes have inelastic demand on average. Inelastic demand tends to occur
close to the departure date. We ﬁnd that 85% of routes have inelastic demand in the ﬁnal ten
days before departure. We ﬁnd no correlation between elasticity and number of searches
for the route. In fact, although many of the inelastic routes tend to be routes from a large
city to smaller regional cities, we ﬁnd that the smallest and largest routes by search volume
have elastic demand.
In Online Appendix D.2, we discuss demand estimates under alternative scaling param28

eters. Our ﬁndings are quantitatively similar under these alternative speciﬁcations.

8

Firm Beliefs about Demand

With our demand estimates in hand, we now ask, What does the ﬁrm believe demand
looks like? To answer this question, we recover the preference parameters that best match
the RM department’s demand forecasts.
We proceed in two steps. First, we recover “ﬁrm beliefs” on the arrival processes. We
assume the RM department uses the same model of consumer arrivals and that the total
intensity of demand is the same as our estimates, i.e., λt ,d = λt λd . However, we allow the
composition of arriving customers to vary over the booking horizon. For every route, we
calibrate γt as

P
=P
γbeliefs
t

ArrivalsBt

ArrivalsBt +

P

ArrivalsBt

,

where ArrivalsBt is the total number of arrivals classiﬁed as business for route r (L is similarly deﬁned) using the passenger classiﬁcation algorithm. With these estimates, ﬁrm be)
for business passengers, and λt λd (1 − γbeliefs
liefs on the arrival processes are λt λd γbeliefs
t
t

for leisure trafﬁc. We label these Poisson distribution rates λ̃Bt,d and λ̃Lt,d .
Second, we recover preferences using the forecasts. These data are the predictions of
sales quantities at the ﬂight, departure date, passenger type, price, and day before departure.
Whereas our previous analysis used the aggregate forecast (see Section 4.3), here we use
the forecasts at the consumer-type level, ℓ ∈ {L , B }.
We assume the RM department also uses a Poisson demand model, with the same
speciﬁcation as ours. Because the algorithm selected by the RM department considers
single-product demand, we consider a single-product setting when recovering beliefs. We
consider the unconstrained, cumulative forecast,
Q̃ jℓ,k ,t ,d :=

X
k 0 ≥k
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E Q jℓ,k 0 ,t ,d .

which is the forecast of (uncensored) unit sales at a price of k for consumer type ℓ. This
forecast coincides to the deﬁnition of demand in economics, i.e., quantity demanded for
a given price level. We assume the forecasting model assigns λ̃ℓt ,d as the arrival process
for each ﬂight j ∈ Jd .15 Our assumptions allow us to match the forecasting data to its
corresponding model counterpart,
Q̃ jℓ,k ,t ,d = λ̃ℓt ,d s jℓ,k ,t ,d (·).

If we take logs of the equation above and subtract the log of the outside good share, we can
use the inversion of Berry (1994) to obtain the following estimation equation

log

Q̃ jℓ,k ,t ,d
λ̃t ,d


ℓ
ℓ
− log(s0,t
) = log(s jℓ,k ,t ,d ) − log(s0,t
) = δ̃ℓj ,k ,t ,d .
,d
,d

(1)

This is only possible because the forecasting data is at the consumer-type level, which
allows us to avoid using the contraction mapping in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)
and Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006). Moreover, the inversion allows us to impose similar
restrictions imposed in our model, i.e., the only difference in mean utility across consumer
types is on the price coefﬁcient.16
Deﬁning the left-hand side of Equation 1 above as δ̃, we obtain a linear estimating
we could assume arrivals are λ̃ℓt ,d / J , so that each ﬂight receives 1/ J of arrivals. This increases
product shares and results in consumers estimated to be more price insensitive.
16 We must also confront a data limitation in that our forecasting data is not necessarily at the t level, but
rather, at a grouping of t s the ﬁrm uses for decision making. The number of days in a grouping varies.
We address this data feature in the following way. Note that our demand model does not have t -speciﬁc
parameters—preferences do not vary by day before departure. Therefore, if Q̃ ℓ is the forecast for consumer
type i for multiple periods, the model analogue to this is
15 Instead,

ℓ
Q̃·,t
∗ =

X
t ∈t ∗


λ̃ℓ·,t s·,tℓ (·) =

X
t ∈t ∗


ℓ
λ̃·,t
s·i (·).

We can simply sum over the relevant time indices for arrival rates because the time-index does not enter
within-consumer type shares, and the forecasting data assumes a constant price within a grouping of time.
This is important because we can then deﬁne consumer-type product shares as
P

ℓ
Q̃·,t
∗
ℓ
t ∈t ∗ λ̃·,t
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= s ℓ (·).

equation of the form
δ̃ = X β̃ − α̃p + ξ + u ,

where β̃ , α̃B , α̃L are preferences to be estimated. We include our estimated ξ in the model,
which is the mean of the posterior for that observation taken from our estimates. Thus,
this approach also estimates a "ξ" that also differs across consumer types through u . We
set these residuals equal to zero after recovering ﬁrm beliefs. These assumptions do not
greatly impact our ﬁndings.
Figure 9: Firm Beliefs on Demand
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Note: (a) Comparison of product shares across consumer types, over time. (b) Estimates of γt versus those calculated using the passenger
assignment algorithm. (c) Forecasted demand across consumer types, over time. (d) Comparison of own-price elasticities over time. (b)
and (d) contain the 25th and 75th percentiles. Results are reported averaging over all observations in the data.

Thus, we obtain the following inversion,

log P

ℓ
Q̃·,t
∗
ℓ
t ∈t ∗ λ̃·,t


− log(s0ℓ ) = log(s ℓ ) − log(s0ℓ ) = δ̃ℓ .
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(2)

In Figure 9 we show that our demand estimates (Model E) are quite different than those
recovered from the forecasting data (Model B). In panel (a) we plot product shares for both
passenger types over time. Model B results in consumer types being “closer together” than
under Model E, with leisure travelers being more price inelastic than under our estimates.
In panel (b), we plot the probability that an arriving customer is a business traveler. Model
E places more mass on business travelers and produces larger changes in the types of consumers arriving over the booking horizon. Model B suggests a signiﬁcant drop in business
consumer arrivals very close to departure. Panel (c) highlights that Model B inﬂates early
arriving demand and understates business passenger demand close to departure. Finally,
in panel (d), we plot own-price elasticities over time. Model E produces elasticities that
are increasing (toward zero) as γt increases, whereas Model B results in mostly constant
elasticities that then drop close to departure. This is due to both the probability of business
declining close to departure and prices increasing substantially.
Overall, the two models are quite different. Model B yields more compressed demand
elasticities where aggregate demand is more inelastic well in advance of the departure
date than compared to Model E. This is driven by the upward bias in the forecasting data
along with reduced variance in the forecasts across ﬂights (relative to bookings). Model E
suggests that there is more heterogeneity in demand across both ﬂights and routes, with a
more pronounced change in the overall price sensitivity of arriving consumers over time.

8.1 How compatible are the pricing and RM departments’ decisions?
Before turning to counterfactuals, we revisit the notion of miscoordination in that the fare
choices of the pricing department are misaligned to the demand predictions by the RM
department. We consider a simple scenario: Suppose capacity were sufﬁciently large so
that capacity costs are zero. In this scenario, the dynamic pricing problem collapses to
a static pricing problem. What would be the revenue maximizing price? The optimal
price—according to the RM department’s forecasts—sets marginal revenue equal to zero,
or M R Model B (p ) = 0. This price identiﬁes the lowest price that the ﬁrm should ever charge
32

under Model B demand because scarcity would only increase the price.
We solve for the revenue maximizing price with zero capacity costs and compare these
prices to the observed fares. We ﬁnd that only 49.6% of observations involve fare menus
where the minimum menu price exceeds the price that solves M R Model B (p ) = 0. Although
we ﬁnd that 85.1% of ﬁled fares are higher than the lowest price that should ever be charged
(higher fare classes are more expensive), 29.8% of observed prices are below the optimal
price if capacity were unconstrained. These results match our descriptive evidence that
fares are often too low, particularly close to departure when the booking rate increases as
fares increase.

9

Empirical Analysis of Pricing Inputs

We quantify the impacts of the pricing biases we have documented on welfare through
several counterfactuals. We explore three questions: (1) How does correcting biases individually affect welfare; (2) What are ﬁrst-best optimal outcomes for the ﬁrm, (3) Are teams
best responding to the (biased) inputs of other teams?
Our baseline model approximates current practices. We use the demand estimates based
on the RM department’s forecasts (Model B) and the observed fare choices by the pricing
department to compute baseline fares, allocations, revenues, and consumer surplus. We
then consider two counterfactuals that investigate biases within teams and miscoordination
as discussed in Section 4. First, we address forecasting bias by replacing Model B demand
estimates with the Model E demand estimates. We leave the pricing menus unaltered.
Second, to address miscoordination between teams, we tailor the pricing menus set by
the pricing department to Model B demand estimates. To implement this counterfactual,
we eliminate the ability for the pricing algorithm to choose any fare below M R Model B =
0.17 This addresses the miscoordination described in Section 4 and Section 8.1 that the
17 We

have also implemented this counterfactual by setting the ﬁrst fare equal to the price that solves

M R = 0 using the Model B demand estimates. We then increase fares by scaling prices from 1× to 2.5× the

minimum price spanning the number of observed buckets for each route. The results are similar.
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pricing team often ﬁles fares that are on the inelastic side of the RM department’s forecasts
(according to Model B). We leave the forecast set to Model B in this counterfactual.
These counterfactuals do not necessarily coincide with “second-best” outcomes for the
ﬁrm, or where teams best respond to the biased inputs/processes of the other team. We
explore the second best in Section 9.3. We also simulate a “ﬁrst-best” outcome, where
pricing is centralized under a single team that uses Model E demand estimates with fare
menus tailored to the Model E demand forecast. These menus are derived by ﬁrst solving
M R Model E = 0. This deﬁnes the lowest price on the menu. We then increase fares by scaling

prices from 1× to 2.5× the minimum price spanning the number of observed buckets for
each route.
One bias not addressed in these counterfactuals is that the pricing algorithm itself is
also biased. We perform additional counterfactuals that allow for cross-price elasticities in
a model of dynamic pricing in Online Appendix E.

9.1 Counterfactual Implementation
For each counterfactual, we simulate ﬂights based on the empirical distribution of observed
remaining capacity 120 days before departure. For each vector of initial remaining capacities, we then draw preferences and arrival rates given our demand estimates (Model E). We
simulate 10,000 ﬂights for each combination of initial capacity and the drawn preference
parameters. Like our demand model, we do not endogenize connecting (or ﬂow) bookings.
Therefore, we handle connecting bookings through exogenous decreases in remaining capacity, based on Poisson rates estimated using connecting bookings.18 Consumers are assumed to arrive in a random order within a period. If demand exceeds remaining capacity,
consumers are offered seats in the order they arrive. Therefore, if the lowest-priced fare has
a single seat and is sold immediately, the next arriving consumer within a period is offered
18 Alternatively,

we could subtract off observed connecting bookings from the initial capacity condition.
However, this constrains initial capacity and results in higher prices than what we observe in the data.
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the next least-expensive fare.19

9.2 Welfare Comparison
We report counterfactual results in Table 3 where we aggregate over all ﬂights and routes.
Our baseline model—used to approximate present day airline pricing practices—is shown
in the ﬁrst row. Here, we use the demand model based on the ﬁrm’s forecasts (Model
B), and the observed fares ﬁled by the pricing team. We normalize the outcomes in this
baseline to 100% for all welfare measures (leisure and business consumer surplus, quantity
sold, revenues, and welfare).
Table 3: Counterfactual Estimates and a Comparison to Present Practices
C SL

C SB

Q

Re v

W

1) Observed Fares, Model B Forecast

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

2) Observed Fares, Model E Forecast

99.9

99.8

99.7

101.9

100.6

3) Altered Fares to Model B Forecast

69.4

102.7

85.4

93.0

97.3

4) Altered Fares to Model E Forecasts 121.0

64.1

92.3

118.6

86.6

Counterfactual

Note: In counterfactual (1), we approximate current pricing practices. Counterfactual (2) and (3) address a single organizational team
bias, but leave others in place. Finally, in counterfactual (4), we consider a scenario in which RM and pricing department decisions are
coordinated.

In Row 2 of Table 3, we investigate the impact of correcting the bias in the RM department’s demand forecasts, while preserving the coordination problem with the pricing team.
To do this, we simulate outcomes keeping the ﬁled fares at their observed levels, but replacing Model B demand estimates with Model E demand estimates. We ﬁnd that total welfare
under this counterfactual is within 0.6% of the calculated welfare for the benchmark case
in Row 1. This occurs because the pricing algorithm generally expects that future demand
19 Note

that this differs from our demand model where all consumers are assumed to pay the same price
within a period. However, because arrival rates are low, consumers very rarely pay different prices in our
simulations. This is consistent with the data as well. We remove seven markets from our analysis that are
estimated to have inelastic demand throughout time. These markets feature very low arrival rates and a very
high percentage of zeros (over 95%). Our results are robust to including these routes, though the average
revenue gains are over 5% higher with the inelastic routes included.
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can be accommodated with remaining capacity under both Model E and Model B demands.
Therefore, the opportunity cost of capacity estimated within the pricing algorithm is sufﬁciently low such that the algorithm typically allocates units to the lowest ﬁled fare. Because
the fare menus are the same in both counterfactuals, the lowest ﬁled fare is made available
in both cases. As a result, ﬁxing the forecast in isolation does not affect market outcomes.
Row 3 addresses the miscoordination problem between the fare menu choices and
Model B forecasts. Recall that in Section 8.1, we found that prices are commonly set
on the inelastic side of the RM department’s demand estimates (Model B). We ﬁnd that
removing fares on the inelastic side of the Model B forecasts actually reduces overall revenues by 7%. Although this ﬁnding may appear counterintuitive, recall that in this scenario
fares are aligned to a biased forecast. Our results show that coordinating fares could actually provide worse outcomes for the ﬁrm (as well as consumers). We ﬁnd that for 44% of
the routes in the sample, revenues increase in this counterfactual. For over 56% of routes,
revenues are within 1% of the baseline scenario. For the remainder of routes, and in particular, for a few routes that cater heavily to leisure customers, we ﬁnd that current prices are
actually too high (in terms of comparing M R = 0 under Model B and Model E). Removing
the lowest fares on the menu exacerbates the problem of pricing too high, particularly well
in advance of the departure date. In this counterfactual, we estimate that leisure consumer
surplus would decline by 30.6%, and business consumer surplus would only increase by
only 2.7%. Coordination without addressing all biases reduces overall welfare by 2.7%.
In Row 4, we consider a “ﬁrst-best” scenario, where the ﬁrm uses the unbiased forecast
(Model E) in conjunction with price menus coordinated to that unbiased forecast. This
counterfactual represents the “as if” scenario where pricing is centrally decided at the ﬁrm.
We estimate a signiﬁcant reallocation of capacity compared to the benchmark case. The
reason is that passenger types are further apart in terms of preferences according to Model
E estimates. Because capacity is often not constrained, in this counterfactual fares early
on tend to fall. Fares close to departure are much higher because business customers have
higher willingness to pay according to Model E (see Figure 9. This leads to lower transacted
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prices among leisure consumers, increasing leisure consumer surplus. Business consumer
surplus falls sharply. Revenues would increase by 18% due to increased price targeting.
Overall dead-weight loss would also rise in the markets studied.

9.3 Second Best Outcomes for the Firm
Our results establish that market outcomes are largely unchanged if a team corrects its own
bias in isolation. We now ask: How close are current inputs to the second-best optimal
inputs for the ﬁrm? We consider two scenarios. The ﬁrst investigates how the upstream
team—the pricing department—can correct for downstream forecast bias introduced by
the RM department. In this scenario, we assume that the pricing department knows the
Model E demand estimates and adjusts their fare menus (using the same process as in
Section 9.1). These menu adjustments are made knowing that the RM department will use
the biased Model B forecasts along with the pricing heuristic.
We also investigate the second-best outcome for the ﬁrm in which the RM department
adjusts their forecast, holding upstream fare decisions by the pricing department ﬁxed.
Because the RM department typically scales up or down the forecast for an entire route
with a scaling parameter, we implement this counterfactual in a similar way. We have the
RM department solve for inventory allocations using ESMR-b and the Model B forecast
scaled up uniformly by a scaling parameter χ . We consider χ ∈ {1.0, 1.25, ..., 13.75}. For
each χ , the RM department solves for inventory allocations using the manipulated forecast
and then simulates ﬂights according to the non-manipulated, Model B forecast. The optimal
χ is the scaling factor that maximizes expected revenues. For example, if the menus set by

the pricing department tend to feature fares that are too low for Model B demand, the RM
department can scale up/boost the forecast to inﬂate opportunity costs. This will raise the
distribution of fares offered We use the Model B forecast in this counterfactual because it
uses information currently within the ﬁrm, and thus, is perhaps more realistic in terms of
being implementable.
Results for these two counterfactuals appear in Table 4, which are also normalized to
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Table 4: Counterfactual Estimates of Second-Best Outcomes for the Firm
C SL

C SB

Q

Re v

W

5) Pricing Department uses Model E forecast

122.5

64.0

92.7

117.6

86.4

6) RM Department manipulates Model B forecast

77.7

94.0

89.7

106.2

97.2

Counterfactual

Note: In Row 5 we consider a counterfactual in which the pricing department adjusts their fare menus according to Model E forecasts,
and the RM department uses the Model B forecast when determining inventory allocations. In Row 6 we consider the counterfactual in
which the RM department adjusts the Model B forecast using a single scaling parameter (up/down), and the pricing department keeps
the fare menus constant.

observed practices (Row 1 of Table 3). We ﬁnd that the second-best outcomes for the ﬁrm
are not close to current outcomes. For example, if the pricing department best responded
to the forecasting bias introduced by the RM department, we estimate that revenues would
close 95% of the gap between Row 1 and Row 4 of Table 3. The fact that this second-best
outcome is so close to the ﬁrst-best outcome highlights the importance of the pricing menu
decisions of the upstream team (the pricing department). We ﬁnd that properly accounting
for the average change in willingness to pay over time in the pricing menu decisions is signiﬁcantly more important than having a pricing algorithm that also reoptimizes in response
to demand shock realizations. As a result, market segmentation is the driving force for
price adjustments rather than responding to scarcity.
In contrast, we ﬁnd that if the RM department best responded to the misalignment
between the pricing department’s fare menus and Model B demand (see Row 6 of Table 4),
the forecast should be signiﬁcantly more biased in order to raise the distribution of fares
offered. The average optimal χ is 7.5, with a standard deviation of 5.4. The optimal
adjustment to the current demand model goes against observed practices in that analysts
tend to deﬂate the forecast (see Figure 4). The second-best outcome is to inﬂate the forecast
more. Averaging across routes, we ﬁnd that signiﬁcantly more biased forecasts would
close 33% of the gap between Row 1 and Row 4. This number is substantially lower than
the other second-best outcome (95%) because inﬂating opportunity costs across the entire
booking horizon is less effective at targeting speciﬁc consumer groups with higher prices.
Note that leisure consumer surplus declines in this scenario, relative to Row 5, and business
consumer surplus is relatively high compared to Row 5.
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9.4 Discussion
In all counterfactuals except one, the ﬁrm would be better off if teams adjusted their pricing
inputs. This raises a natural question: Why have economic forces not led to different
outcomes in multiple years of data? Although we cannot establish a causal link to the
pricing biases we explore, the data, code, and supporting documentation suggest some
likely mechanisms.
One potential mechanism is that ﬁrms are concerned about non-revenue metrics which
would tend to lead to low prices. Our estimates of the ﬁrst-best (and second-best) optimal
outcome would lead to a reduction in tickets sold. This conﬂicts with metrics airlines
commonly emphasize in public reports. We collect and process all airline earning calls
between 2013 and 2019. In over half the calls, all major airlines emphasize load factor,
or the percentage of seats occupied. Of course, maximizing load factor is not the same as
maximizing revenues.
Load factors are also emphasized internally along with metrics on forecasting bias. Our
counterfactual that investigates the second-best outcome if the RM department manipulated
its forecast to account for the coordination problem is feasible (e.g., it does not require a
new forecasting model), but ﬁrm norms may prevent its implementation. Not only does
meeting load factor targets puts downward pressure on prices—in the opposite direction
of the second-best results—we found that the optimal scaling factor χ averages 7.5. It is
unlikely that managers would accept forecasts that are biased upwards of 750%, when they
are trying to reduce error.
In addition to performance metrics, another likely mechanism for the persistent pricing
biases is the lack of information transmission across teams. Our descriptive evidence suggests miscoordination is never addressed in a two year data sample even though both an
issue and ﬁx are known to one team within the ﬁrm. It could be that the costs of improving
coordination and aligning input decisions are especially high. For example, we observe that
only 1.6% of prices are adjusted by the pricing department. Perhaps realigning team information sets and decision processes makes observed outcomes “optimal” in the presence of
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substantial organizational costs.
We also note that the clickstream data suggest limited experimentation at the ﬁrm.
Without experimental variation, managers may be unable to measure the substantial differences in willingness to pay across consumer types as our demand estimates suggest.
We observe an identiﬁer for consumers subject to experiments as well as a code to denote
unique experiments. The number of experiments run, and the number of consumers subject
to experiments, is very low.
We argue that some mechanisms are less plausible. Although it may be that the ﬁrm
has long-run demand considerations in mind when determining prices (supporting lower
prices), we note that the RM forecasts and the algorithm objective focus on short-run demand and revenues, respectively. Moreover, sometimes the forecasts of neighboring departures dates are adjusted in response to demand shocks—again highlighting short-run
considerations (see Online Appendix E for an example). It is unclear why long-run demand estimates would yield persistently biased upward forecasts that in general understate
(overstate) the number of low (high) priced tickets sold. Related to long-run demand, another reason to offer lower fares is to reward customers for loyalty. However, the data
establish that more expensive tickets tend to be purchased by more loyal customers. If a
large fraction of “business” customers do not pay for their tickets out of their own wallet, current mileage programs allow customers to reach status faster by purchasing more
expensive tickets.
Another mechanism we argue is less likely to explain our ﬁndings is that the ﬁrm recognizes additional revenues are possible through increased market segmentation, but the
ﬁrm is strategically choosing to offer lower prices as a response to the threat of a entry
(Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Sweeting, Roberts, and Gedge, 2020). We view this as
implausible because the biases we document in Section 4 affect all markets and are even
more pronounced in markets with competition. It is unclear why a ﬁrm would also price
on the inelastic side of demand when already facing direct competitors.
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10

Conclusion

In this paper, we study pricing at a large U.S. airline where distinct organizational teams
manage speciﬁc pricing inputs. We provide evidence of pricing biases and miscoordination. To quantify the welfare effects of these pricing biases, we estimate a structural demand model and conduct counterfactual experiments using a pricing heuristic that closely
approximates what the ﬁrm uses in practice. We show that addressing pricing biases within
teams individually does not substantially change market outcomes. Although biases are
not reinforcing, they are not perfectly offsetting. Observed outcomes differ from optimal
second-best outcomes for the ﬁrm. Finally, we show that if teams correct and coordinate
on algorithm inputs, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reallocation of capacity across consumer types.
Leisure consumers would beneﬁt from lower fares, but business travelers would face signiﬁcantly higher fares. Revenues would increase, but so would dead-weight loss.
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A

All US Airlines have the same Organizational Structure

Our description of airline pricing is not unique to the airline we study—all airlines have
the same organizational structure and use similar pricing techniques. We show this by
collecting job postings information for all the major carriers in the U.S.20 We conﬁrm
that Alaska, American, Delta, JetBlue, Southwest, and United have a network planning,
pricing, and revenue management department. As an example, JetBlue Airlines job postings show that the ﬁrm has three teams related to pricing: Future Schedules, Revenue
Management-Pricing, and Revenue Management-Inventory. Job details delineate team responsibilities. The Revenue Management department at JetBlue has two separate teams,
Pricing and Inventory. The Pricing team has ownership over fares by “monitoring industry pricing changes ﬁled through a clearinghouse throughout the day, and determining and
executing JetBlues response.”21 The Inventory team uses “inventory controls to determine
the optimal fare to sell at any given moment in time to maximize each ﬂights revenue.”22
American Airlines managers describe how inventory controls are implemented in Smith,
Leimkuhler, and Darrow (1992)—they outline EMSR-b. Because all carriers have the same
organizational structure and use similar algorithms, we believe our analysis characterizes
the entire industry, rather than the perspective from a single ﬁrm.

B Details on the Pricing Heuristic, EMSR-b
We approximate the solution to a dynamic pricing (DP) problem using a well-known
heuristic in operations research, Expected Marginal Seat Revenue-b or EMSR-b (Belobaba, 1987). The heuristic was developed in order to avoid solving highly complex dynamic
pricing problems. The heuristic simpliﬁes the ﬁrm’s decision in each period by aggregating
all future sales before the deadline into a single future period. It also simpliﬁes the demand
system to be for only a single product, so competitive effects cannot be considered. We
20 Screenshots

of the job postings are available on request.

21 See https://careers.jetblue.com/job/Long-Island-City-Analyst-Revenue-Management-NY-11101/737962800/.
22 See https://careers.jetblue.com/job/Long-Island-City-Analyst-Revenue-Management-NY-11101/737962800/.
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describe this process below and show how to incorporate Poisson demand in EMSR-b. It is
important to note that EMSR-b provides an allocation over a given ﬁnite set of prices, instead of providing the optimal price itself given any state of the world. EMSR-b associates
each price with a fare-class then chooses a maximal number of sales that can be made to
each fare-class. This means that consumers may face different prices within a single pricing
period when one class is closed and a higher priced class opens.

B.1 Littlewood’s Rule
EMSR-b is a generalization of Littlewood’s rule, which is a simple case where a ﬁrm prices
two time periods uses two fare classes. A ﬁrm with a ﬁxed capacity of goods (seats) wants
to maximize revenue across two periods, where leisure (more elastic) consumers arrive
in the ﬁrst period and business (less elastic) consumers arrive in the second period. The
ﬁrm sets a cap on the number of seats b it is willing to sell in the ﬁrst period to leisure
passengers. This rule returns a maximum number of seats for leisure when the price to
both leisure and business customers has already been decided; it does not determine optimal
pricing.
The solution equates the price of a seat sold in the ﬁrst period (to leisure travelers) to the
opportunity cost of lowering capacity for sales in the second period (to business travelers).
Given prices pL , pB , capacity C , and the arrival CDF of business travelers FB , Littlewood’s
rule equates the fare ratio to the probability that business class sells out. The fare ratio is
the marginal cost of selling the seat to leisure (the lower revenue pL ) which is set equal to
the marginal beneﬁt—the probability that the seat would not have sold if left for business
customers only. Littlewood’s rule is given by
1 − FB (C − b ) =

pL
.
pB

This equation can then be solved for b , the maximum number of seats to sell to leisure
customers in period one. This solution is exact if consumers arrive in two separate groups
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and there are only two time periods and two consumer types.

B.2 EMSR-b Algorithm
The EMSR-b algorithm (Belobaba, 1987) extends Littlewood’s rule to multiple fare levels
or classes. For each fare class, all fare classes with higher fares are aggregated into a single
fare-class called the “super-bucket.” Once this bucket is formed, Littlewood’s rule applies,
and can be done for each fare class iteratively. Rather than just comparing leisure and
business classes, the algorithm now weights the choice of selling a lower fare-class ticket
against an average of all higher fare classes.
We apply the algorithm for K sorted fare-classes such that p1 > p2 > ... > pK . Each fare
class has independent demand with a distribution Fk . Under our speciﬁcation, the demand
for each fare class is distributed Poisson with mean µk that is given by future arrivals times
the share of the market exclusive to that bucket.
The super-bucket is a single-bucket placeholder for a weighted average of all higher
fare-class buckets. Independent Poisson demand simpliﬁes this calculation, as the sum of
independent Poisson distributions is itself Poisson. The mean of the super-bucket is the sum
of the mean of each higher fare-class bucket. The price of the super-bucket is a weighted
average of the price of each higher-fare class, using the means as the weight.
For each fare class, Littlewood’s Rule is then applied with the fare-class taking the
place of leisure travel, and the super-bucket in place of business travel. It is assumed that
all future arrivals appear in a single day. The algorithm then describes a set of fare-class
limits bk that deﬁne the maximum number of sales for each class before closing that fare
class. We denote the remaining capacity of the plane at any time by C . The algorithm uses
the following pseudo-code:

4

for t > 2 do
for k ← K to 1 by −1 do
i) Compute un-allocated capacity Ck ,t = C −

PK
i =k

bi ,

ii) Construct the super-bucket
µs b =

k −1
X

µi ,

ps b

i =1

k −1
1 X
pi µi ,
=
µs b i =1

Fs b ∼ Poisson(µs b ),

iii) Apply Littlewood’s Rule using the super-bucket distribution as the demand for
business

§
Ck ,t − bk = min Fs b

−1


ª

pk
1−
, Ck ,t .
ps b

end
end
In the case where t = 1, dynamics are no longer important, so there is no longer a need
to trade off based on the opportunity cost. As a result, we limit the fare of the highest
revenue class to all remaining capacity, and set limits of all other classes to zero.
B.2.1

Fare Class Demand

What remains is computing the mean µk for each fare class bucket. We detail the process
in this section. Demand in each market is an independent Poisson with arrival rate exp(λtt +
λdd )s j (p ). Note that this p is a vector of the prices of all ﬂights in the market. We assume

that the ﬁrm believes other ﬂights will be priced at their historic average over the departure
date and day before departure. This allows us to construct a residual demand function s j (p j )
that is a function of the price of the current ﬂight only. We will treat this as the demand for
the ﬂight at a given bucket’s price for the remainder of this section.
Each fare class has a set price pk , at any time t , departure date d we will see exp(λtt +
λdd ) arrivals, of which s (pk ) are willing to purchase a fare for bucket k . However, s (pk −1 )

are willing to purchase a fare for bucket k −1 as well, since they will buy at the higher price
5



pk −1 . Only exp(λtt + λdd ) st (pk ) − st (pk −1 ) are added by the existence of this fare class with

price pk < pk −1 . Note that this is a ﬂow quantity—the amount of purchases in time t , but
EMSR-B requires stock quantities: How many will purchase over the remaining lifetime
of the sale?
What is the distribution of future purchases then? Each day t is an independent Poisson
process split by the share function. Independent split Poisson processes are still Poisson,
so we may compute the mean of purchases solely in a fare class by summing arrivals over
future time t , and taking the difference in shares between price pk and pk −1 . For time t
and departure date d , the stock demand for fare-class k is given by
t
X



exp(λit + λdd ) st (pk ) − st (pk −1 ) ,

i =1

where st (p0 ) = 0 for notational parsimony.
This demand distribution is only used to compute the super-bucket demand distribution.
Note that we only include future stock demand in the super bucket, and thus only sum
arrivals until time t − 1. For fare-class k . The super bucket’s stock demand is given by
µs b =

 t −1
X


exp(λit + λdd )si (pk −1 )

i =1

ps b =

k −1
t −1


1X X
pj
exp(λit + λdd ) si (p j ) − si (p j −1 ) .
µ j =1 i =1

The updated pseudo-code for the EMSR-b algorithm is:
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for t > 2 do
for k ← K to 1 by −1 do
i) Compute un-allocated capacity Ck ,t = C −

PK
i =k

bi (t ),

ii) Construct the super-bucket
µs b =

 t −1
X


exp(λit + λdd ) si (pk −1 ),

i =1

ps b

t −1
k −1


1 X X
=
pj
exp(λit + λdd ) s (p j ) − s (p j −1 ) ,
µs b j =1 i =1

Fs b ∼ Poisson(µs b ),

iii) Apply Littlewood’s Rule using the super-bucket distribution as the demand for
business.

§
Ck ,t − bk (t ) = min Fs b

−1


ª

pk
, Ck ,t .
1−
ps b

end
end
For t = 1 we continue to allocate the highest revenue fare class to the entire remaining
capacity. Note that for this allocation rule, bk (t , d ) is a function of time since the arrivals are
changing over time. This policy can be computed for each time t and remaining capacity
c , for all departure dates d and arrival rates λ.

C Route Selection
We use publicly available data to select markets to study. The DB1B data are provided
by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and contain a 10% sample of tickets sold. The
DB1B does not include the date purchased nor the date traveled and is reported at the
quarterly level. Because the DB1B data contain information solely for domestic markets,
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we limit our analysis to domestic markets as well. Furthermore, we use the air carrier’s
deﬁnition of markets to combine airports within some geographies.
Figure 10: Nonstop, One-stop and Connecting Trafﬁc
Destination
Connecting

Origin

One-stop


Note: We use the term nonstop to denote the sold black line, or passengers solely traveling between Origin, Destination . Unless
otherwise noted, we will use directional trafﬁc, labeled O → D . Non-directional trafﬁc is speciﬁed as O ↔ D . The blue, dashed lines
represent passengers ﬂying on O ↔ D , but traveling to or from a different origin or destination. Finally, one-stop trafﬁc are passengers
ﬂying on O ↔ D , but through a connecting airport.

We consider two measures of trafﬁc ﬂows when selecting markets: trafﬁc ﬂying nonstop
and trafﬁc that is non-connecting. Both of these metrics are informative for measuring
the substitutability of other ﬂight options (one-stop, for example) as well as the diversity
of tickets sold for the ﬂights studied (connecting trafﬁc). Figure 10 provides a graphical
depiction of trafﬁc ﬂows in airline networks that we use to construct the statistics. We
consider directional trafﬁc ﬂows from a potential origin and destination pair that is served
nonstop by our air carrier. The ﬁrst metric we calculate is the fraction of trafﬁc ﬂying
from O → D nonstop versus one or more stops. This compares the solid black line to the
dashed orange line. Second, we calculate the fraction of trafﬁc ﬂying from O → D versus
O → D → C . This compares the solid black line to the dashed blue line.

Figure 11 presents summary distributions of the two metrics for the markets (ODs) we
select. In total, we select 407 ODs for departure dates between Q3:2018 and Q3:2019. The
top row measures the fraction of nonstop and connecting trafﬁc for tickets sold by our our
carrier. The left plot shows that, conditional on the air carrier operating nonstop ﬂights
between OD, an overwhelming fraction of consumers purchase nonstop tickets instead of
purchasing one-stop connecting ﬂights. The right panel shows that fraction of consumers
who are not connecting to other cities either before or after ﬂying on segment OD. There is
8

Figure 11: Route Selection Using Bureau of Transportation Statistics Data
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Note: Density plots over the fraction of nonstop trafﬁc and the fraction of non-connecting trafﬁc for the selected routes using DB1B data.
"Within" means passengers ﬂying on our air carrier. "Total" means all air carriers on a given origin-destination pair. Within nonstop and
total nonstop coincide if our carrier is the only carrier ﬂying nonstop.

signiﬁcant variation across markets, with the average being close to 50%.
Figure 12: DB1B Comparison
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Note: (a) A scatter plot of the fraction nonstop and fraction non-connecting for all origin-destination pairs served by our air carrier. The
blue dots show selected markets; the orange dots show non-selected markets. (b) Kernel density plots of all fares in the DB1B data for
our air carrier; the blue line shows the density for our selected markets.
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The bottom panel repeats the statistics but replaces the denominator of the fractions
with the sum of trafﬁc ﬂows across all air carriers in the DB1B. Both distributions shift to
the left because of existence of competitor connecting ﬂights and sometimes direct competitor ﬂights. In nearly 75% of the markets we study, our air carrier is the only ﬁrm
providing nonstop service. Our structural analysis will only consider single carrier markets.
In Figure 12-(a), we show a scatter plot of the fraction of nonstop trafﬁc and the fraction
of non-connecting trafﬁc for all origin-destination pairs offers by our air carrier in the
DB1B. The orange dots depict routes non-selected markets and the blue dots show the
selected markets. We see some dispersion in selected markets, however this is primarily
on non-connecting trafﬁc. An overwhelming fraction of the selected markets have high
nonstop trafﬁc, although this is true in the sample broadly. Essentially, conditional on
the air carrier providing nonstop service, most passengers choose nonstop itineraries. In
Figure 12-(b) we show the distribution of purchased fares in the DB1B for our carrier along
with our selected markets. The distribution of prices for the selected sample are slightly
shifted to the right, which makes sense since we primarily select markets where the air
carrier is the only airline providing nonstop service.

C.1 Estimation Sample Comparison
Our estimation sample contains 39 markets. Compared to the overall sample, these routes
tend to be smaller in terms of total number of passengers, larger in terms of percentage
of nonstop and non-connecting passengers, and nonstop service is provided only by our
air carrier. We report percentage differences between our estimation routes and the entire
sample for key characteristics below in Table 5. Figure 13 shows a two-way plot of the
fraction of nonstop and non-connecting trafﬁc for the routes selected for estimation relative
to the entire sample.
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Table 5: Estimation Routes Comparison
Characteristic

Percentage Difference from Mean

Number of Nonstop Passengers
Total Number of Passengers
Number of Local Passengers
Fraction of Trafﬁc Nonstop
Fraction of Trafﬁc Non-Connecting

-38.8%
-33.4%
-37.7%
1.02%
5.91%

Note: Statistics calculated using the DB1B data for the years 2018-2019.

Non-con. Traffic Fraction

Figure 13: Route Estimation Selection using DB1B Data
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Note: A scatter plot of the fraction nonstop and fraction non-connecting for all origin-destination pairs served by our air carrier. The
blue dots show markets used for estimation; the orange dots show non-selected markets.

D

Additional Details on Demand Estimation

D.1 Demand Estimation Procedure
We provide an overview on the implementation details of each stage the MCMC routine for
demand parameter estimation. Simultaneously drawing from the joint distribution of our
large parameter space is infeasible, therefore, we use a Hybrid Gibbs sampling algorithm.
The algorithm steps are shown below. At each step of the posterior sampler, we sequentially draw from the marginal posterior distribution groups of parameters, conditional on
other parameter draws. Where conjugate prior distributions are unavailable, we use the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, a rejection sampling method that draws from an approximating candidate distribution and keeps draws which have sufﬁciently high likelihood.
Additional detail can be found in Hortaçsu, Natan, Parsley, Schwieg, and Williams (2021).
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1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

for c = 1 to C do
Update arrivals λ
Update shares s (·)
Update price coefﬁcients α
Update consumer distribution γ
Update linear parameters β
Update pricing equation η
Update price endogeneity parameters Σ
end for
Algorithm 1: Hybrid Gibbs Sampler

(Metropolis-Hastings)
(Metropolis-Hastings)
(Metropolis-Hastings)
(Metropolis-Hastings)
(Gibbs)
(Gibbs)
(Gibbs)

Sampling Arrival Parameters
We start the sampling procedure by drawing from the posterior distribution of arrival parameters, λt ,d . The posterior is derived by deﬁning the joint likelihood of arrivals for each
consumer type and quantities sold, conditional on product shares. Recall that arriving consumers have likelihood based on their type:
A Lt,d ∼ Poisson(λt ,d (1 − γ̃t )ζLt ),
A Bt,d ∼ Poisson(λt ,d γ̃t ζBt ),

where γ̃t is the probability a consumer is of the business type as derived from the passenger assignment algorithm, and ζℓt is the fraction of bookings that do not occur on the
direct channel for each consumer type (leisure and business). The purchase likelihood is a
function of shares and arrivals and is equal to


q̃ j ,t ,d ∼ Poisson λt ,d · s j ,t ,d ,
¦
©
q j ,t ,d = min q̃ j ,t ,d , C j ,t ,d .

This directly accounts for censored demand due to ﬁnite capacity. Since arrivals are restricted to be non-negative, we restrict the set of ﬁxed effects by transforming the multi

plicative ﬁxed effects to be of the form λt ,d = exp Wt ,d τ . We select a log-Gamma prior
12

for τ. We sample from the posterior distribution by taking a Metropolis-Hastings draw
from a normal candidate distribution.
Sampling Shares and Utility Parameters
Updating shares. We treat product shares as unobserved, since the market size may
be very small and lead to irreducible measurement error. We use data augmentation to
treat shares as a latent parameter that we estimate. Conditional on all other parameters
(λ, α, γ, β , η, Σ), product shares are an invertible function of the demand shock, ξ. If we
conditioned additionally on ξ, shares would be a deterministic function of data and other
parameter draws. Instead, we leverage the stochastic nature of ξ, which we explicitly parameterize. The distribution of unobserved ξ is the source of variation for constructing a
conditional likelihood for shares:
−1




s j ,t ,d | β , α, γ, X 

ξ j ,t ,d

=f

υ j ,t ,d

= p j ,t ,d − Z j0,t ,d η



κ = k ∼ N iid (0, Σk )


such that Σk =



σ2
 k ,11
ρk

ρk
σk2 ,22

.

Here, κ is a mapping from days to departure t to an interval (block) of time. That is,
the pricing error and the demand shock have a block-speciﬁc joint normal distribution.
Conditional on the pricing shock υ, the distribution of ξ, fξ j ,t ,d (·), is

ξ υ, κ = k ∼ N

ρk υ
σk2 ,11

, σk2 ,22 −

ρk2
σk2 ,11


.


The density of shares is then given by the transformation f s j ,t ,d (x ) = fξ j ,t ,d f −1 (x ) · Jξ j ,t ,d →s j ,t ,d
where Jξ j ,t ,d →s j ,t ,d is the Jacobian matrix of model shares with respect to ξ. To produce the
full joint conditional likelihood of shares, we also include the mass function for sales,
which are a product of shares and arrivals:
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−1

,

 

ρk υ
σk2 ,11

−1

(t ,d )
f (s j ,t ,d ) −
Y Y JY
 
ϕ
  s
ρ2
t
j
=1
d
σk2 ,22 − σ2 k





 (λt ,d s j ,t ,d )


exp(−λt ,d s j ,t ,d ) 
 · Jξ→s
q j ,t ,d !

q j ,t ,d

−1

,

k ,11

where ϕ(·) is the standard normal density function. We draw from the posterior based on a
uniform prior distribution and normal candidate Metropolis-Hastings draws.
Updating price coefﬁcients, αB , αL . We construct the conditional likelihood (and thus
the conditional posterior distribution) for α = (αB , αL ) in a similar manner to the product
shares. For any candidate value of price sensitivity, we recover a residual ξ, invert the
demand system, and recover a likelihood. Conditional on λ, shares, η, β , and Σ, we
compute the distribution of ξ and determine the likelihood of a particular draw of α, given
by

 
(t ,d )
Y Y JY
t

d

j =1



ρk υ
σk2 ,11

−1

f (s j ,t ,d ) −
 
ϕ  s
ρ2
σk2 ,22 − σ2 k


 · Jξ→s

−1

,

k ,11

where ϕ(·) is the standard Normal density function. We impose a log-Normal prior on α,
and impose αB < αL to avoid label-switching. To draw from the conditional posterior, we
take a Metropolis-Hasting step using a normal candidate distribution.
Updating the distribution of consumer types, γ.

We allow for the mix of consumer

types to change over the booking horizon t . We deﬁne γ from a sieve estimator of the
booking horizon t , and we sample the sieve coefﬁcients, ψ, according to

γt = Logit G (t )0 ψ ,

where G (t ) is a vector of Bernstein polynomials. The logistic functional form ensures that
the image of γ in the interval (0, 1). The inversion procedure used to construct the likelihood
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is similar to α and shares. It yields a likelihood for sieve coefﬁcients ψ of the form
 
(t ,d )
Y Y JY
t

d

j =1

ρk υ
σk2 ,11

−1

f (s j ,t ,d ) −
 
ϕ  s
ρ2
σk2 ,22 − σ2 k



 · Jξ→s

−1

.

k ,11

We use a uniform prior on ψ, and we sample from the posterior with a Metropolis-Hastings
step using a normal candidate draw.
Updating remaining preferences, β .

To sample the remaining preferences that are

common across consumer types, we impose a normal prior on β , with mean β̄0 and variance V0 . We adjust for price endogeneity to conduct a standard Bayesian regression. Deﬁne
δ j ,t ,d = X j ,t ,d β + ξ j ,t ,d , which is evaluated at the ξ computed in the prior step. We nor-

malize each component of δ by subtracting the expected value of ξ and dividing by its
standard deviation. The normalized
equations have unit variance and are thus conjugate to
s
the normal prior. Let σk ,2|1 =

ρ2

σk2 ,22 − σ2 k be the variance of ξ conditional on υ and Σ.
k ,11

We center and scale δ:
ρ

δ j ,t ,d − σ2 κt υ
κt ,11

σκt ,2|1

=

1

β

σκt ,2|1

X j ,t ,d β̄ + U j ,t ,d ,

where U β ∼ N (0, 1). Then, the posterior distribution of β is N (βN , VN ), where

V0 −1 β0 + X̂ 0 δ̂ ,

−1

βN = (X̂ 0 X̂ + V0 −1 )

−1

VN = (V0 −1 + X̂ 0 X̂ ) ,
X̂ j ,t ,d =
δ̂ =

X j ,t ,d
σκt ,2|1

,
ρ

δ j ,t ,d − σ2 κt υ
κt ,11

σκt ,2|1

.

Given this normalization, we can draw directly from the conditional posterior distribution
of β using a Gibbs step.
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Sampling Price-Endogeneity Parameters
Updating pricing equation, η.

We use a linear pricing equation of the form
p j ,t ,d = Z j ,t ,d η + υ j ,t ,d .

Conditional on shares, λ, γ, α, and β , ξ is known. Therefore, we use the conditional
distribution of υ given ξ to perform another Bayesian linear regression in a similar manner
s

to β . We impose a Normal prior and normalize prices. Deﬁne σκt ,1|2 =
follows that

ρ

p j ,t ,d − σκκt,22 ξ j ,t ,d
t

σκt ,1|2

=

1
σκt ,1|2

ρ2

σκ2 t ,11 − σ2 κt . It
κt ,22

η

X j ,t ,d η̄ + U j ,t ,d ,

where U η ∼ N (0, 1). Just as we did for β , we can draw from the posterior of η from a linear
regression with unit variance. This step allows us to directly sample from the posterior of
η rather than using a Metropolis-Hastings step.

Updating the price endogeneity parameters, Σ. We ﬂexibly model the joint distribution
of ξ and υ by allowing for a route-speciﬁc, time-varying correlation structure. We divide
the booking horizon into four equally sized 30-day periods, and each block is indexed k .
We restrict the price endogeneity parameters Σ, which determine the joint distribution of
ξ, υ, to be identical within these blocks. Within each block, the pricing and demand residual

follow the same joint distribution. We draw the variance of this normal distribution with a
typical Inverse-Wishart parameterization. Our prior for Σk is I W (ν, V ) where k refers to
the block. Deﬁne the vector Yk = (υ, ξ) to be the collection of residual pairs conditional on
block k , and Yk ∼ N (0, Σk ). The posterior for the covariance matrix Σk is then
Σk ∼ I W (ν + nk , V + Yk0 Yk ).

Block k has nk observations. This Gibbs step is repeated for each block k , and we sample
directly from the conditional posteriors of Σ.
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D.2 The Impact of the Scaling Factor on Demand Estimates
We consider alternative speciﬁcations on our scaling factor ζ in order to understand how
changes in imputed market size affect our demand estimates. Our biggest concern is that
our scaling factor may understate the presence of price-sensitive consumers who primarily
shop with online travel agencies. For each route, we adjust our leisure scaling factor by
multiplying the original scaling factor by 1.5, 2, 3, 5 and 10. We ﬁnd that between 1.5 to
3 times the original scaling factor, our demand estimates are largely unchanged. For larger
scaling factors—between 5 and 10—we ﬁnd that demand becomes less price sensitive far
from departure and more price sensitive close to departure. The parameters most affected
by this scaling are the parameters governing the probability of business, γ. As we scale
up the leisure arrival process, our estimated probability of business falls. The change in
consumer types over time is reduced, however, we still estimate average elasticities to be
similar to the baseline model.

E Additional Counterfactuals
EMSR-b is a heuristic and is itself biased (Wollmer, 1992) because it does not consider substitute products. To account for substitutes, we also consider counterfactuals where prices
are determined by solving a dynamic pricing problem. We follow the dynamic pricing (DP)
problem in Williams (2021), where a ﬁrm selects a price for each ﬂight from a discrete set
of prices that maximizes its current and expected future proﬁts. We assume that the ﬁrm
solves


Vt (C t , pt ) = max Ret (C t , pt ) + EVt +1 (C t +1 , pt +1 | C t , pt ) ,
p ∈Pt

where C t is the vector of remaining capacity for each ﬂight offered in that time period, pt
is the vector of prices the ﬁrm selects, and R te (C t , pt ) is the ﬁrm’s expected ﬂow revenue.
These value functions are speciﬁc to a route and departure date.
We consider two versions of the DP. We ﬁrst simulate pricing for each ﬂight indepen-
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dently, assuming other ﬂights will be priced at the lowest priced fare. This is analogous to
how we proceed with EMSR-b. We then consider a multi-product DP and limit ourselves
to | J | = 2 due to the dimensionality of the more complicated environments. Our DP results
are thus based on a selected set of routes (and departure dates). We use the coordinated fare
menus derived under Model B and Model E as inputs. These fares may not be optimal in
the multi-product setting.
Table 6: Counterfactual Estimates under an Alternative Pricing System
Counterfactual
C SL
C SB
Q
Re v
W
1)

Pricing heuristic EMSR

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

2)

Single- J Dynamic Pricing

95.0

99.0

98.5

100.6

99.6

3)

Multi- J Dynamic Pricing

93.4

97.2

101.5

100.9

98.8

Note: In counterfactual (1) prices are set using EMSR-b with Model E and the coordinated price menus. Counterfactual (2), endogenously sets prices for each ﬂight independently using the DP. Finally, counterfactual (3) we jointly set prices of all products in the same
market using the DP.

In Table 6, we compare Row 4 of Table 9 to models of dynamic pricing that also use
these inputs. We report two rows after our EMSR-b results corresponding to the situation
where the ﬁrm optimizes ﬂight prices individually and one in which the ﬁrm prices ﬂights
jointly. Outcomes are normalized to ESMR-b. We estimate marginally lower consumer surplus and slightly higher revenues under dynamic pricing. These results are not due to the
discrete nature of prices—implementing a continuous-price version for single ﬂight markets yields quantitatively similar results. Overall, we ﬁnd that accounting for cross-price
elasticities results in a marginally higher revenues and lower consumer surplus compared
to EMSR-b. These effects are relatively small compared to correcting forecasting bias and
coordinating fares to the correct demand curves using the pricing heuristic.
One concern with Model E is that it assumes the ﬁrm knows preferences and arrivals
rates in advance. The forecasting data allow us to explore learning about demand. We
ﬁnd that with the current system, reactions to “surprises” occur too little and too late. In
particular, demand forecasts respond to demand surprises with delay, leading to missed
opportunities both for the ﬂight in question, but also for future ﬂights which are mistakenly
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thought to be over-(or under-) demanded.
Figure 14: Reacting to Surprises: A Conference Example
t-14
t-7
Conference Date (t)
t+7
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Note: All plots contain data series for ﬂights departing the date of a large conference (which moves both location and dates each year)
and the corresponding ﬂights in the surrounding weeks of the conference. (a) Shows the average load factor across ﬂights (b) Contains
the average lowest available fares across ﬂights (c) Has the average total expected seats to sell at a given point in time unconstrained by
the remaining capacity.

To demonstrate how the ﬁrm updates its beliefs about demand, in Figure 14 we show average load factors, fares, and forecasted demand remaining for a particular route-departure
date. This departure date is special because it involves a conference which alternates both
date and location each year. In addition to ﬂights on the conference date, we include information for ﬂights on this route one week before and after the conference date for comparison. As shown in panel (a), as soon as the location and date of the conference is
announced, around 200 days from departure, there is a sudden jump in load factor. The
ﬁrm’s revenue management software responds with delay (over a month) to the sudden
jump in bookings. Prices eventually increase dramatically as seen in panel (b). Panel (c)
shows that the forecasting algorithm, having observed the conference shock, then inﬂates
the forecast of remaining demand for the following week—to higher levels than the conference date. That is, the algorithm incorrectly believes the next week will now also involve a
conference. However, in panel (a) we see that the ﬂights a week later contain no surprises—
bookings follow a similar pattern as other dates. Consequently, fares are too high for the
non-conference ﬂights and too low for a conference ﬂights.
Instead of directly incorporating how the RM department updates its forecasts toward
the departure date, we consider an alternative, simpler model where the ﬁrm has “persistently average beliefs,” or where the ﬁrm prices according to avg(λ) and avg(β ). The ﬁrm
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0

knows γ and α in this counterfactual. This behavioral model need not provide a good approximation to the actual learning environment but it allows us to investigate if our ﬁndings
are driven by the ﬁrm knowing all preferences in advance. We ﬁnd that even with average
beliefs, results are similar to scenario (4) in Table 3, with a 15% increase in revenues.
Essentially, knowing the average change in willingness to pay over time is very important, much more so than variation in preferences and arrival rates across departure dates.
Correcting beliefs about the average shape and evolution of demand—when paired with
coordinated fare options—is the key driver of the welfare effects in our counterfactuals.
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